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This dissertation puts forth a series of arguments about the role of affect in everyday 
cognition. I begin in chapter 1 by developing a generalized philosophical and scientific 
account of what “affective” states—a term encompassing emotions, moods, 
pleasures/pains, and felt desires—are and how they arise. From there, I address a 
number of debates in moral psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy of art that revolve 
around the function of affective states. In chapter two, I weigh in on a long-standing 
disagreement about the automaticity of empathy; I contend that different so-called 
“kinds” of empathy are not in fact automatic, and that an explanatorily robust model of 
empathy must account for the influence of affectively-laden “underlying values.” In 
chapter three, I focus on the “processing fluency” view of aesthetic pleasure, which 
equates aesthetic pleasure with ease of perceptual processing. I critique and amend this 
view by highlighting the ways in which perceptual disfluency and negative affect also 
contribute positively to aesthetic appreciation. And, in chapter four, I attempt to redress 
  
the so-called “paradox of fiction” by claiming that emotions do not require belief-states 
to be considered real and theoretically rational instances of emotion. To do this, I point 
to research on affective prospection and mind-wandering to argue that emotions must 
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CHAPTER 1 
ALL ABOUT AFFECT 
I. INTRODUCTION
People’s lives are profoundly emotional. On a daily basis, we run a gamut of 
feelings both evolutionarily ancient and cognitively complex, from happiness, 
sadness, anger, and fear, to satisfaction, offence, pride, and awe. Indeed, on average, 
adults report spending approximately 90% of their waking days in one or more of 
these emotional states—and those are just the emotions that make it into conscious 
awareness!1As scientific research on emotion has grown over the last several 
decades, it has become apparent that sentiments such as these are far from idle. 
Emotions impact how we represent and engage with others, make decisions, form 
judgements of value and preference, develop notions of moral right and wrong, and 
motivate us to take interest in the world around us. And yet, despite its intuitive 
significance, many questions remain about the precise role that emotion plays in 
everyday cognition. 
The aim of this dissertation is to resolve some of those questions. In the 
chapters that follow, I address a number of long-standing debates in moral 
psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy of art, all of which revolve around the 
function of emotion. In chapter two, I focus on a well-established dispute over the 
1 These figures were found by polling participants at random intervals throughout the day and 
surveying them as to the presence of 18 emotional states that are relatively high-arousal, e.g. awe, 
anxiety, joy, etc. (Trampe, Quoidbach & Taquet, 2015). Given that low-arousal and mildly valenced 
emotions themselves provide appraisals about the environment (e.g. boredom, contentment), and 
given the plausibility of unconscious affect (see section III), we are arguably in some sort of 
emotional or affective state at all times. 
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automaticity of empathy and argue that a complete model of empathy must account 
for the underlying influence of emotionally-laden values. In chapter three, I amend 
a promising theory of aesthetic pleasure by highlighting the ways in which 
perceptual disfluency and negative emotions contribute positively to aesthetic 
appreciation. And, in chapter four, I attempt to redress the so-called “paradox of 
fiction” by claiming that emotions do not require belief-states to be considered real 
and theoretically rational instances of emotion. In short, each chapter is respectively 
intended to clarify emotion’s functional roles in empathy, aesthetic preference, and 
engagement with fiction. 
Since each part of this dissertation explores different aspects of emotional 
processing in different contexts, they may be read independently of one another and 
in any order. Taken together, however, these targeted investigations contribute to 
the broader goal of clarifying the nature of emotional appraisal in its own right. To 
set the tone for this overarching project, I begin here by laying out a highly 
generalized philosophical and scientific account of what affective states are (section 
II), how they arise (section III), and what sets them apart from one another (IV). 
These are themselves subjects of considerable debate, so delineating which 
metaphysical commitments we need to make before exploring affect’s function is 
a necessary first step. Having established this general account, I will summarize the 
ways in which subsequent chapters aim to demystify the role of affect in empathy, 
art, and beyond. 
 
II. WHAT AFFECTIVE STATES ARE: FEELING, MOTIVATION, & 
EVALUATION 
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Consider the case of Zoe the Zookeeper.  
Zoe has just accepted a job cleaning the lion 
enclosures at a local animal rehabilitation center. On 
her first day of work, Zoe wakes up with a knot in 
her stomach and is filled with a mixture of nervous 
excitement and anxiety. When she gets to the center, 
she is assured that the lions have all been put in an 
adjoining enclosure (separated by ten inches of 
unbreakable glass, no less) so that they cannot harm 
her. While tending the grounds near the glass barrier, 
a large, captive lion suddenly lunges ferociously in 
Zoe’s direction. She shrieks and pulls away so 
quickly that she trips, landing painfully on the hard 
ground. Upon hearing the commotion, Zoe’s new 
supervisor runs over to make sure everything is 
alright: Zoe is embarrassed by her dramatic reaction, 
turns red in the face, and laughs apologetically—of 
course she knew she was safe, why was she so 
frightened? Over the course of the day, the lions 
pounce ferociously at Zoe several more times, only 
now she is able to maintain her composure…she 
even finds their fruitless efforts somewhat amusing! 
At the end of her shift, Zoe leaves work satisfied with 
herself for a job well done. 
 
In this vignette, Zoe is undoubtedly feeling quite a lot. She experiences 
anxiety, amusement, fear, pain, embarrassment, satisfaction, and more, all over the 
course of a single day. But, what exactly are these feelings? After all, at first glance 
states such as these appear to be remarkably different from one another across a 
multitude of dimensions. For instance, some of Zoe’s feelings are negative or bad-
seeming (e.g., the pain of falling), while others are positive or good-seeming (e.g., 
the pleasure of amusement). Some are about specific events or objects in the world 
(e.g. her fear of the lunging lion), while others do not seem to be about any one 
particular thing at all (e.g., her general sense of anxiety). Some are fleeting (e.g., 
her immediate surprise as the lion pounces), while others are likely to prove more 
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pervasive (e.g., her excitement throughout the day). Some involve marked bodily 
or behavioral changes (e.g., blushing in embarrassment), while others do not entail 
obvious physiological manifestations (e.g., calm satisfaction). And some involve 
simple, reflexive processing (e.g., terror at the sight of a large, predatory animal), 
while others appear to be predicated on more sophisticated cognitive appraisals 
(e.g., new-found confidence when the lions lunge yet again). How are we to make 
sense of such a disparate array of mental phenomena? 
In everyday speech, we might—as I have done up until this point—
characterize Zoe’s first day on the job as one that is intensely emotional or full of 
feelings; and it certainly is! In scientific parlance, however, it would be more 
accurate to describe her day as one that is robustly colored by affect. For theorists 
working in the sciences and empirically-minded areas of philosophy, the term 
‘affect’ encompasses a wide range of mental states: these include not only 
emotions, but moods, sensory pleasures and pains, and felt desires. Later in this 
chapter, there will be much to say about what makes these kinds of affect distinct 
from one another. Before we explore those differences, however, we should first 
lay out a picture of what seems to unify such prima facie disparate states under the 
same conceptual schema. What features do mental states like emotions, moods, 
pleasures and pains, and felt desires share in common? 
Establishing this unifying characterization is admittedly a delicate task. 
Over the last century or so, scholars have increasingly turned their attention towards 
the underlying nature of affect, both as a singular category and with respect to 
particular affective states such as emotions. In that time, many debates have taken 
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root—most notably, debates about the constitutive components of affective states 
(see below), and the extent to which we might classify them as natural kinds (see 
section IV). These investigations have inspired several competing traditions, each 
of which emphasize unique defining criteria. Importantly, since the focus of this 
dissertation is on the function of affect, I do not wish to commit myself to any one 
of these metaphysical views here. Rather, it is my aim to motivate a generalized 
description of affect that appeals to some of the field’s most widely converged upon 
insights. In so doing, I hope to make progress on the question of what affect does 
in ways that will be both fruitful and palatable to theorists across the board.  
So, what shared insights have emerged from these debates? One of the more 
thoroughly explored points of contention in the affect literature centers on what 
Jesse Prinz has appropriately deemed the “problem of parts,” or the problem of 
identifying the necessary and sufficient components of affective mental states—
specifically, emotions (2004).2 In the philosophical tradition, answers to this line 
of inquiry have varied tremendously since the time of the ancient Greeks.3 In more 
recent years, however, three broad approaches to this “problem” have emerged as 
theoretical front-runners in both philosophical and scientific circles: those that 
argue for the constitutive role of (1) phenomenology and physiology in emotion 
(one’s “feelings”), those that do the same for (2) motivation, and those that claim 
2 It is worth noting that much of the literature I will explore in this section focuses squarely on 
analyzing instances of emotion (rather than, say, moods or pains/pleasures), either because 
these writings pre-date contemporary research on the broader category of affect, or because 
they were specifically aimed at characterizing emotion as a unique mental phenomenon.  
3 Here, I will focus on approaches that have been elaborated upon in the last several decades, 
but early formulations of these views can be found in the works of ancient Greek and Medieval 
philosophers as well. 
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cognitive (3) evaluation as emotion’s essential trait. Since each of these 
components will factor into our working model of affect, it will be useful to step 
back for a moment and review why an emphasis on the roles of phenomenology, 
physiology, motivation, and evaluation have both theoretical and intuitive appeal. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, philosopher and psychologist William 
James placed special emphasis on the roles of (1) phenomenology and physiology 
with his articulation of emotional non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivism stands in 
contrast to what James described as the “common sense” model of emotion, 
wherein it is assumed that we perceive the world, then “cry, strike, or tremble, 
because we are sorry, angry, or fearful [emphasis mine]” (James, 1884). According 
to non-cognitivists like James, the causal arrows in this picture are amiss: we do 
not perceive, experience emotion, and then feel. Rather, he argues that emotions 
are constituted by awareness of automatic and reflexive (hence “non-cognitive”) 
changes to our bodily states. On this view, when Zoe experiences e.g. fear, she does 
so because the mere sight of the lion triggers an immediate increase in heart rate, 
muscle tension, pupil dilation, perspiration, etc., and it is Zoe’s awareness of those 
states that makes her afraid. Strip away the feeling of those unwitting bodily 
changes, the non-cognitivist contends (return the heart rate to normal, relax 
muscular tension, ease visual processing, calm perspiration, etc.), and there 
intuitively seems to be no fear left of which to speak.  
While non-cognitivism nicely accounts for the apparent automaticity of our 
emotions and has been defended by prominent scholars (Robinson, 1995, 2004; 
Prinz, 2004; Zajonc, 1984), others have worried that this view seems to rob emotion 
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of its causal import. John Dewey, a contemporary of James, remarked that if 
someone like Zoe were really afraid because she e.g. experienced an increase in 
heart rate and turned to run, then her state of fear would play no explanatory role 
with respect to the pounding in her chest and her sudden startle backwards; fear 
itself would be causally inert (1895). These observations led Dewey to argue that 
specific emotional states are best identified by their (2) motivational contents. In 
modern versions of this tradition, emotions are often described either as 
evolutionarily adaptive mechanisms that shift one’s action tendencies, or as states 
of action-readiness themselves (Deonna and Teroni, 2015; Ekman 1999; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2008; Scarantino, 2015). According to these motivational theories, when 
Zoe is in a state of fear, she is in that state by virtue of her multifaceted disposition 
(either conscious or unconscious, occurrent or inactive) to flee, fight, or otherwise 
solve for the evolutionary problem of threat. 
In the mid-20th century, a number of philosophers began to point out that 
views such as these neglect a crucial component of emotional processing, cognitive 
(3) evaluation. For, while it is clear that our responses to stimuli are often reflexive
and fundamentally motivating, they also seem highly responsive to our complex 
judgements about the world. The first time the lion lunges at Zoe, for instance, she 
is presumably frightened because she evaluates her situation as one that is bad or 
threatening. But, as soon as that judgment changes (e.g. once she is reminded that 
she can observe the powerful animals without risk), she suddenly finds herself 
entertained by the lions’ predatory displays. Philosophers in the evaluative or 
“cognitivist” camp have used this observation to identify emotions with the 
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tokening of particular judgments, i.e. to be afraid just is to judge something as 
dangerous, bad, undesirable, and so on (Nue, 2000; Solomon, 1988). This view 
nicely captures the intuition that emotions are fundamentally intentional, i.e. that 
they are object-directed or seem to be about things.  
While these traditions have been highly influential and are still maintained 
by many, they are not exhaustive, nor need they be mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
many scholars are now starting to eschew the reduction of emotion to any one of 
these components. Instead, they opt for hybrid theories that claim constitutive roles 
for various combinations of physiological feeling, motivation, and evaluation 
(Helm, 2009; Tappolet, 2016). Roberts, for instance, suggests that emotion is best 
understood as a kind of perceptual experience of our “impressions” of the world, 
thereby attempting to account for both the sensory-like phenomenology of 
emotions and the fact that they seem to entail assessment (2003). Others have 
placed emphasis on identifying emotions as feelings, but have argued that such 
feelings are imbued with intentionality qua feelings towards things (Goldie, 2000). 
Of course, different iterations of these views have different strengths and 
weaknesses, all of which are well worth considering in the context of the larger 
metaphysical debate.4 For our purposes here, however, we need not make any such 
commitments about the necessary and sufficient conditions of emotions, nor any 
other affective state. By highlighting some of the considerations that motivated 
these traditions, my aim has merely been to show that prototypical instances of 
emotion reliably have such components, whether they play a constitutive role or 
4 Unfortunately, a full investigation of these nuanced views would take us far afield from the 
project at hand. For a more comprehensive review of these “traditions,” see Scarantino, 2016. 
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not. When Zoe becomes afraid of the lion, (i) her heart-rate spikes and her breath 
quickens, (ii) many of these bodily changes are introspectively accessible upon 
reflection, i.e. if asked, Zoe would report that she felt afraid in that moment, (iii) 
she has a strong disposition to get away from the lion (so strong, in fact, that she 
stumbles to the ground while pulling back); and (iv) she instantly appraises the lion 
as potentially bad or threatening. Were any one of those reactions missing entirely, 
one might reasonably question whether Zoe was afraid at all. 
Crucially, these components seem to obtain not only in cases of emotion, 
but in cases of mental phenomena like moods, sensory pleasures and pains, and felt 
desires as well. Though much separates these states conceptually (see section IV), 
they share this much in common. When Zoe wakes up with a mood of anxiety, for 
instance, that mood likely entails (i) heightened physiological arousal, (ii) feelings 
of unease (iii) motivation to be on the alert, and (iv) an evaluation that things are 
bad or could go very poorly. When she falls backwards and experiences pain, we 
can assume that (i) her blood pressure and cortisol levels spike, (ii) she finds the 
experience to be unpleasant, (iii) she is disposed to cry out and cradle her injured 
elbow, and (iv) she evaluates that sensation as negative. And, by the same token, 
were Zoe to feel a desire to e.g. eat a celebratory piece of chocolate at the end of 
the day, that felt desire might issue forth in (i) salivation at the sight of chocolate, 
(ii) awareness of her craving for a decadent treat (iii) taking steps to procure
chocolate when able, and (iv) evaluating chocolate as a good or worthwhile thing. 
This, then, is our bare-bones model of what affect is as a descriptive 
category. When scholars refer to affective states, they are pointing to mental states 
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that involve concerted changes in (i) physiology, (ii) phenomenology (ii) 
motivation, and (iv) evaluation. So far, so good. Unfortunately, simply identifying 
these important components does not tell us much about the processes by which 
affective states are reached—an issue that will be fundamental to exploring the role 
of affect in later chapters. To fill in this gap, we will have to look more closely at 
theories that deal with how our affective evaluations are formed. 
III. HOW AFFECT ARISES: APPRAISAL, VALUES, & VALENCE
In our brief overview of cognitivism, we saw that there are good reasons to 
emphasize the role of cognitive evaluations in our affective lives. After all, even 
when our responses to the world seem automatic, they also appear to be highly 
sensitive to context and framing, i.e. they require some sort of evaluation of events 
and objects in the world around us. But, how are we to understand evaluations 
themselves? As we saw earlier, some philosophers have claimed that evaluations 
are best understood as judgments. In early versions of the evaluative tradition, 
judgment is often implicitly characterized as an assent to some proposition, e.g., 
the judgement that I have been wronged (anger), that I am in danger (fear), that a 
situation is beneficial (happiness), etc. But, equating all of our emotional, moody, 
painful, etc. states with mere assent to propositions turns out to be rather 
problematic. 
Most critiques of judgmentalism turn on the fact that one can consciously 
assent to a proposition without instantiating any of the other components that we 
have come to associate with affect. One could, for instance, make the judgement 
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that “so-and-so has insulted me” without being motivated to do anything about it. 
If one thinks that said insult is in no way important or germane to one’s daily life, 
that judgment might remain motivationally inert with respect to both disposition 
and action.5  Relatedly, merely assenting to the proposition that one has been 
insulted does not necessarily result in the physiological and phenomenological 
changes we associate with anger, i.e. one can acknowledge that they have been 
insulted without feeling angry. And most worrisome, judgmentalist formulations of 
evaluation struggle to account for “recalcitrance” sentiments, or emotions that seem 
to persist despite the presence of judgments that should undermine them (D’Arms 
& Jacobson 2003). Zoe could, for instance, find herself feeling frightened by the 
lions on her second day of work, even though she now genuinely avows that she is 
not in danger.  
Clearly, then, the evaluations that undergird our affective states cannot be 
judgements simpliciter. They must be special kinds of judgments that link up 
predictably with all of the elements listed in our generalized model of affect. But, 
of course, this observation tells us little about how those special judgments arise or 
why they coincide with changes in feeling and motivation. Fortunately, in the last 
sixty years, cognitive psychologists have made considerable progress on this issue 
by elaborating on the concepts of appraisal and valence.  
Simply put, affective appraisal is the process through which an individual 
determines the subjective significance of any given situation, event, or object 
5 If, for instance, you were traveling in a foreign country where some gesture were considered 
the height of insult, you could feasibly be on the receiving end of that gesture and judge that you 
have been insulted without feeling any motivational force to do anything about it or even, for 
that matter, care. For more on the relationship between affect and caring, see chapter 2.    
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(Arnold, 1960). When Zoe feels afraid of the lion, that sentiment seems to be 
predicated on an appraisal of the lion as something that is, for instance, bad. 
Crucially, what makes this act of affective appraisal distinct from generic judgment 
is the process by which it occurs. While a traditional characterization of judgment 
hinges on one’s higher-order assent to propositional content, most models of 
appraisal allow for evaluative pathways that are both (1) unconscious, fast, 
automatic, associative, stereotypic, etc., and (2) conscious, slow, effortful, logical, 
etc. (see e.g. Kirby & Smith, 2000, Scherer 2001). These pathways correspond 
roughly with Daniel Kahneman’s distinction between “system 1” and “system 2 
processing,” and as such will be differentially recruited under specific conditions, 
i.e. stress, fatigue, type of stimuli, etc. (2011).
This process model of appraisal has considerable explanatory power.  First, 
it elaborates on the sense in which even knee-jerk, “automatic” emotions involve 
something like evaluation. When Zoe is first startled by the lion, it is because she 
immediately appraises the lunging animal as bad via reflexive, associatively 
learned or innate mechanisms,6 hence her instantaneous and violent attempt to flee. 
Soon, however, Zoe’s more complex appraisals of e.g. her relative safety, 
the  importance  of  professionalism, etc., dominate, and  her  fear  is quelled.  In 
short, both responses involve appraisals, they are merely generated through 
different pathways. Crucially, although these appraisal processes are independent, 
they are not isolated. One’s overall affective state is not the result of a single instant 
of appraisal: rather, our affect shifts and changes over time through extensive and 
6 Studies have shown that humans are predisposed to automatic fear responses in the presence 
of e.g. large, predatory animals (Garcia, 2017)  
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continuous re-appraisal. Unconscious appraisal of another person as dangerous 
might, for instance, output heightened arousal and motivational tendencies to guard 
oneself against attack—those physiological/motivational outputs can then be taken 
as input to more conspicuous appraisals of that person as untrustworthy or 
threatening. This is why Zoe’s fear may abate gradually, and in ways that are 
responsive to changes in her environment and internal states. 
Second, this model explains what judgementalism could not with respect to 
recalcitrant emotions. More often than not, our reflexive and reflective assessments 
of the world inform and reinforce each other.7 That said, because these two types 
of processing are especially sensitive to different types of information, we would 
also expect them to dissociate from time to time. In particular, associative 
processing is sensitive to perceptual information that may not be semantically 
encoded (and thus is largely unavailable to conscious reasoning). Reasoning, by 
contrast, allows us to e.g. draw connections between one's current and prior 
experiences, make logical inferences, etc., all of which may be unavailable for 
associative processing until they have been made and stored in memory. So, 
although Zoe may consciously appraise herself to be safe, an unwitting appraisal of 
the lions’ sharp teeth and powerful claws may override those reflective judgments 
in determining that stimuli’s significance—namely, as e.g. bad or imminently 
harmful. 
7 For instance, you might consciously appraise your friend to be a good person because of the 
generous ways that she has treated you over the years, while also unconsciously appraising her 
familiar demeanor and non-threatening body language as pro-social. Both of these appraisals 
would reinforce your overall assessment that she is, in fact, a lovely person.  
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It is worth noting that an object or event’s significance, in this sense, cannot 
be appraised in a vacuum. Indeed, how Zoe evaluates the world seems to be very 
much a function of things like her goals, intentions, and values. Consider Zoe’s 
embarrassment after falling in front of her new supervisor. Assuming that Zoe 
values being seen as a competent employee, she would likely appraise this 
interaction as negative. But, suppose for a moment that Zoe did not in fact want to 
keep her job at the zoo; she took the position as a summer job to placate her parents, 
and clandestinely hopes to be fired as soon as possible. Under those conditions, Zoe 
would likely appraise her employer’s looks of concern as significant in a positive 
light—she might even ham up her performance as a clumsy and incapable worker! 
Interestingly, this dependence on one’s underlying values is evident even in the 
case of appraisals that are swift and automatic. For, although human beings seem 
to have an innate fear of stimuli that are snake-like (Roach, 2001), a 
herpetologist with years of experience handling snakes safely would likely 
not experience immediate fear in the presence of a harmless, coiled reptile.8 
Appraisal, so construed, is a context-sensitive process that determines 
significance. Appraisals of different kinds of significance appear to directly result 
in changes to one’s physiology, motivation, and phenomenology. An appraisal of 
dangerousness might, for instance, activate one’s fight-or-flight response. In this 
state, one’s heart rate and breathing become rapid, peripheral blood vessels in the 
skin constrict (which is why we grow “pale with fear”), attention becomes narrowed 
8 Though I will not explore the issue at length here, in chapter 2 we will see that there has been 
some confusion over whether or not particular sorts of concerns give rise to different kinds of 
valence. I will try to clarify this issue there. 
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in on the source of danger and potential routes of escape, and muscles tense in 
preparation for e.g. flight. All of these physiological and motivational changes 
impact not just how we behave, but how we feel, i.e. they can be accessible in 
conscious awareness and often contribute to what it feels like to be e.g. in a panic. 
But, importantly, these are not the only things that impact the phenomenology of 
affective states. Appraisal also generates valence. 
Valence is, very roughly speaking, what makes our affective states seem 
good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, attractive or aversive, etc. While there is some 
disagreement over which of these characterizations is more apt, there is strong 
consensus that valence is what makes our emotions, moods, pleasures and pains, 
and felt desires either positive or negative (see Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1990; 
Solomon and Stone, 2002; Russell, 2003; Charland, 2005; Colombetti, 2005; 
Barrett, 2006). Going back to our working example, Zoe’s anxiety, fear, pain, and 
embarrassment are negatively valenced, while her excitement, satisfaction and 
amusement are positive.  
Importantly, this demarcation between negative and positive valence is not 
merely conceptual. The hedonic tone of our appraisals in general seem to be 
encoded within a number of limbic areas including the anterior insula, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex (Rainville et al., 1997; 
Peyron et al., 2000; Levy & Glimcher, 2012). Furthermore, there is good evidence 
that unique mechanisms exist for the processing of e.g. pleasant and unpleasant 
stimuli (Lewis et al., 2007; Viinikainen et al., 2010). Specifically, scientists have 
found regions of the brain that correlate exclusively with negative valence (e.g., the 
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior midcingulate cortex, frontal pole, inferior 
parietal cortex), and others that correlate with positive valence (e.g., substantia 
nigra, ventral striatum, right caudate nucleus; see Colibazzi et al., 2010). Granted, 
this binary model of valence does not mean that all affective experiences must be 
unambiguously experienced as positive or negative in any given instant. One could, 
for example, realize that she has been insulted, appraise that state of affairs as 
negative, and feel angry, while also appraising her own moral outrage as an 
appropriate, good-seeming and hence pleasurable response: hence, righteous 
indignation. Even in the case of “mixed emotions,” however, changes in regions of 
the brain that signal valence seem to correspond directly with the mélange of good 
and bad-seeming sentiments that we experience. 9 
As an output of the appraisal system, valence has a number of important 
features that account for its relation to the motivational, physiological, and 
phenomenal components of affect. As I previously noted, valence appears to be 
causally linked to the phenomenology of affect, i.e. the sensations of good and bad-
seemingness that we experience when in affective states. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
neuroimaging studies suggest that clinically depressed patients tend to have lower 
activation of positive valence systems during reward tasks and greater baseline 
negative valence activation when compared to nondepressed controls (J. P. 
Hamilton et al., 2012; Pizzagalli, 2014). These differences account for depression’s 
ability to rob individuals of the phenomenal pleasure we associate with more 
9 Whether we are, in these cases, flipping back and forth between valenced appraisals or 
simultaneously tokening contradictory valenced appraisals is an interesting and open empirical 
question that I will address in chapter 2. 
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positive emotional states. Furthermore, valence appears to be the mechanism by 
which states like pain and pleasure derive their phenomenal content. For example, 
notice that pain is not merely a representation of one’s bodily condition. Although 
people on morphine are able to accurately report the sensory-motor qualities of their 
injuries, they no longer feel those sensations as bad. Even on morphine, Zoe would 
still experience a descriptively sharp, stabbing sensation in her right elbow upon 
falling, she simply would no longer feel it as painful. In short, when valence is 
mitigated, it directly impacts what we feel in conscious awareness.10 
It is also generally assumed that valence is intrinsically motivating. In both 
philosophy and the sciences, there has been a long tradition of viewing e.g. 
pleasure and pain as fundamentally motivational. When one e.g. feels pleasure 
while eating chocolate, that pleasure presumably functions as a signal that eating 
chocolate is good (or that chocolate is good), which serves as a catalyst for action. 
But, notice in this case that it is not the overall feeling of pleasure that is 
motivating, but valence as an indication of seeming-goodness.11 This distinction 
is important, since it allows us to make sense of the fact that valence plays a 
fundamental role in both conscious and unconscious decision-making. It has been 
10 Similarly, sensorially pleasurable experiences are not reducible to mere sensory 
representation. One may derive great pleasure from eating chocolate, but eating tremendous, 
unending quantities of chocolate over time will soon cease to be pleasurable. This is because 
satiety mitigates positive valence, even though the gustatory qualities of the chocolate remain 
constant.   
11 It is very worth noting that seeming-goodness and pleasure are not identical. One might feel 
considerable sensory pain when receiving a flu shot (because the prick of the needle is appraised 
as bad-seeming), but still affectively appraise that medical procedure as good overall. In fact, this 
appraisal of painful activity as good-seeming has clinically been shown to decrease overall 
negative valence, and hence mitigate the painfulness of pain. As such, valence qua seeming-
goodness/badness seems to be what motivates us to action. For a more thorough defense of this 
characterization of valence, see (Carruthers, 2018). 
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shown, for instance, that when we prospect—when we imagine various options or 
courses of action available to us—valence-signals are ultimately what determine 
the choices that we make (Gilbert & Wilson, 2005). That is to say, it is the 
appraised positivity and negativity of our options that leads us to act as we do. 
Conscious prospection may often include phenomenally conscious bouts of 
pleasure that are motivational, as when prospection about vacationing in Spain 
feels pleasurable. But, neither prospection nor valence need to be consciously 
accessible. Much of our rapid-fire, affectively laden decision-making occurs 
outside of conscious awareness (e.g., when you select one chair out of many to sit 
in), and even conscious acts of prospection need not produce felt valence to result 
in motivation.12 
The fact that valence plays this strong motivational role has noteworthy 
theoretical ramifications. It has led many to suggest, for instance, that valence 
functions as a singular, “common currency” for comparing, ranking, and choosing 
between diverse options. (e.g., McNamara and Houston, 1986; Cabanac, 1992; 
Montague and Berns, 2002; Pfister and Böhm, 2008; Levy & Glimcher, 2012). 
On the common currency model, in order to choose between two very different 
alternatives—say, going to the gym vs. staying home to indulge in that piece of 
chocolate—one would have to be able to compare those options on a single 
dimension (as I have articulated it so far, seeming-goodness and seeming-
badness). That is because positing multiple types of positive and negative valence 
makes these activities look rather incommensurate. If there were one type of 
12 Both appraisals and valence, then, can arise outside of conscious awareness. 
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valence for e.g. goal-congruence and another for pleasure-conduciveness, it isn’t 
clear which activity would seem like the better option (gyms are good for goals, 
and chocolate is good for pleasure). If valence is the summation of a target’s 
overall positive and negative value, however, we would be able to weigh valence-
signals and come to a concrete decision.  
Whether or not valence is itself a single natural kind, and whether it 
contributes to affective states in ways that make them natural kinds is a highly 
contentious topic. “Core affect” theories maintain that valence is one-
dimensional. They argue that affect as a broad category is a natural kind because 
it varies reliably along stable axes of valence and arousal while denying that 
status to our folk-concepts of unique emotions (Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 
1999; Barrett & Wager, 2006). These are also often referred to as “psychological 
constructionist” views, because they claim that emotions are the result of 
downstream social construction and internalization. This stands in opposition to 
“categorical” theories of affect, which place emphasis on the notion that we have 
innate, discrete operating systems for each ‘basic’ emotion.13 On this account, 
some of our affective folk-concepts do pick out natural kinds—specifically, those 
that are individuated by different types of valence and patterns in neurobiological, 
physiological, expressive, behavioral, and phenomenological responses (e.g. 
Ekman, 1992; Panskepp 1998). Still others maintain that we have some “affect 
program emotions” that may be classified as natural kinds, while others are 
higher-order and socially constructed (Griffiths, 1997).  
13 For more on the debate between categorical and dimensional models of affect, see e.g. Zachar 
& Ellis (2012). 
19
In chapter 2, I will spend some time defending a one-dimensional 
characterization of valence that should be amenable to both “categorical” and 
“dimensional” sides of this debate. The question of natural kinds is not, however, 
one that I will be addressing here. Whether or not our folk concepts of emotion 
constitute natural kinds is currently an open and worthwhile question. So too is the 
status of affect as a broad category. But those open questions should not have any 
impact on our ability to theorize about the function of states which bare the affective 
markers we have explored thus far.  
 
IV. KINDS OF AFFECT: TARGETS & CAUSES 
At this point, we have seen that affective states entail concerted shifts in physiology, 
phenomenology, motivation, and evaluation. We have also explored the roles of 
appraisal and valence in eliciting those changes. But, if all of our emotions, moods, 
sensory pleasure and pains, and felt desires share these elements in common, what 
sets them conceptually apart?14 To address that question, let us first establish some 
terminology that will be useful both here and throughout this dissertation. 
By and large, phenomena such as emotions, pleasures and pains, and moods 
are distinguished by the nature of their “targets.” The target of an affective state is 
simply the object at which an appraisal of goodness or badness is directed; it is what 
the feeling is about. Because affective appraisals are always elicited by something, 
14 All of the characterizations that I provide here are aimed at laying out broad, descriptive 
definitions of emotions, pleasures and pains, moods, and felt desires—I hope to have done so in 
a way that is roughly compatible with ordinary linguistic usage. As before, I do not intend to 
make any metaphysical claims about whether these boundaries obtain in producing natural 
kinds; indeed, many folk-concepts of affect seem to span these categories or altogether defy 
categorization.  
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i.e. are reactions to something, it is unsurprising that they are generally about 
something in this way. But, notice that an affective state’s represented target is not 
necessarily what causes that appraisal in the first place. Over the last few decades, 
many researchers have found that appraisals of seeming-goodness and badness can 
be caused by one stimulus and then misattributed unwittingly to unrelated targets. 
Reading moral vignettes while in a dirty room, for instance, has been shown to 
intensify sentiments of moral outrage and anger towards the contents of the 
vignettes themselves. While the target of these subjects’ anger is the moral 
vignettes, the cause is presumably the participant’s reaction to filthy reading 
conditions (Schnall et al, 2008). This effect has been shown to be surprisingly 
pervasive under the right conditions: it has been observed in relation to ratings of 
attractiveness in the presence of spirited music (Marin et al, 2017), romantic interest 
in the presence of danger (Schachter & Singer,1962), social preferences in the 
presence of particular scents (Li et al, 2007), and gustatory preferences in the 
presence of smiling vs. frowning faces (Winkielman et al, 2005). 
To see why this misattribution is possible, recall that our affective appraisals 
can and often are reached via unconscious, associative processing (see section III). 
If the cause of an affective appraisal is subtle (largely perceptual, nonobvious, or 
hidden from focal attention) it can produce valence to which we have a hard time 
attributing a target. In the study by Winkielman et al., for instance, affect was only 
misattributed when its causes were inaccessible to conscious awareness. In that 
study, the presence of frowning and smiling faces only had an impact on beverage 
preference ratings when those faces were backwards masked, i.e. presented 
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subliminally. Similarly, Li et al. found that smells could shift social preferences 
only when those smells were barely detectable. In these cases, with little 
environmental information to go off of, participants likely inferred through 
conscious reasoning that the valence-signal they felt was related to more "obvious" 
but incorrect stimuli. 
So, how do causes and targets bear on our ability to differentiate between 
kinds of affect? Well, to begin with, all affective states have causes and targets of 
one sort or another (they are all evoked, and they are all about something). In the 
case of emotion, however, those targets tend to be clearly specified or delineated, 
i.e. they are directed either at particular entities or states of affairs, and as such can 
usually be expressed by a proposition (de Sousa, 1987). To use our working 
example, Zoe is afraid of the lion, she is satisfied that she had a successful first day, 
she is embarrassed about her dramatic reaction, and so on. This object-directedness 
is taken by many to be a defining characteristic of emotion. In our scenario, Zoe’s 
fear, satisfaction, and embarrassment are all considered instances of emotion 
because they are directed at concrete targets such as the lion, success, and social 
opprobrium, respectively. The targets of these and other emotions tend to follow 
their eliciting stimuli closely or even instantaneously. Although emotional 
misattribution is certainly possible (see above), the cause of one’s e.g., fear and the 
target of that fear are more often than not one and the same, i.e. if a lion’s powerful 
lunge causes negative appraisals, the lion will most likely become the target of that 
appraisal. 
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But, not all affective states take on such clear and causally potent targets. 
Unlike emotions, moods are often distinguished by the targeting of more diffuse 
and nebulous objects (Frijda, 2009). When Zoe wakes up in the morning with a 
knot in her stomach, for instance, it is not necessarily obvious (either to herself or 
to others) what, precisely, her state of anxiety is about. Her nervousness might be 
directed at something as general as her entire life trajectory, her sense of self-worth 
as an individual, or the state of the world at large: it could be about anything! This 
vagueness may arise for a number of reasons. For instance, it is possible that the 
initial cause of Zoe’s appraisals was itself vague, e.g. she really is appraising her 
overall self-worth—a thing for which she has no clear conceptual boundaries. It is 
also possible that her mood did have a concrete cause, but that for whatever reason 
the resulting appraisal has been misattributed to an ill-defined, non-matching target 
(Morris, 1992). That is to say, the cause of Zoe’s negative mood may very well be 
discrete—she may feel nervous because she ill-advisedly watched When Zoo 
Animals Attack the night before her first shift—but fail to attribute those bad 
feelings to the documentary itself; as such, she is left with no obvious target for her 
representations of seeming-badness and a general mood of anxiety.   
Given these broad characterizations of emotion and mood, it might seem as 
though we have covered all instances of affect by default. After all, an affective 
state either takes a target that is representationally identifiable or it does not.15 So, 
where does that leave us with pain and pleasure or felt desire?  
15 This is not intended to sound tautological: the underlying appraisals that drive a mood can 
(and often do) go on to drive an emotion when those appraisals are attributed to a clear target; 
conversely, an emotion can become a mood when its target becomes conceptually confused or 
nebulous, e.g. general anxiety can become fear, and fear can produce general anxiety. 
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On reflection, it would appear as though pain and pleasure take on targets 
that are rather precise and clearly delineated, making them seem more like special 
instances of emotion than anything else. In these cases, we conceptually draw the 
boundary around emotional states whose targets specifically involve one’s bodily 
sensations (touch, taste, sight, sound, smell, etc.).16 When Zoe startles and lands 
squarely on the ground, the target of her mental state is presumably the stabbing 
sensation produced in, say, her right elbow upon impact. Her ‘pain’ is constituted 
by the seeming badness of that sensation. Granted, the occurrence of a sensation 
can also be the target of non-sensory emotional appraisal; were Zoe’s affective state 
to take the descriptive fact of her bruised elbow as its target (rather than the 
sensation itself), she would likely be sad, angry, embarrassed, etc. about the injury. 
But, notice that while we might metaphorically proclaim that she is “pained” in this 
scenario, the object of those particular emotions is not itself a sensory 
representation. 
This sensory vs. non-sensory distinction is not always easy to maintain, 
especially in light of affective misattribution and the impact of top-down 
expectations such as the placebo effect. For example, the bad-seemingness tokened 
while feeling sad about the occurrence of the injury may very well be misattributed 
to the sensation itself, thereby making Zoe’s sensory pain worse than it would have 
been otherwise. Conversely, finding her own fall humorous or entertaining could 
dampen her subjective feeling of pain as she experiences it. This phenomenon has 
16 I specify “sensory” pleasure here to eschew its vernacular (often metaphorical) use which 
encompasses arguably non-sensory “pleasures” such as joy and happiness; by the same token, 
“sensory” pain is intended to exclude non-sensory instances of “suffering” such as depression 
and grief. 
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been observed in a number of contexts, most notably when higher-order 
expectations of perceived benefit mitigates subjective experiences of sensory pain. 
For instance, when we expect that an injection will bring long-term protection from 
e.g. the flu, we tend to appraise the sensation of receiving that injection as less bad-
seeming than we do when the prick of the needle serves no apparent purpose.17 
Nonetheless, even in these sorts of examples, one can still in principle distinguish 
between emotions that take sensory and non-sensory representations as their 
primary targets. 
Finally, felt desires are unique insofar as they seem to be distinguished not 
by the nature of their targets, but by the presence of an especially strong 
motivational component towards those targets. To be clear, not all desires are felt 
or occurrent, i.e., not all desires operate in conscious awareness at all times. When 
Zoe wakes up in the morning, she likely has a vast number of standing desires that 
are not psychologically active while crawling out of bed. She might desire world 
peace, to meet the love of her life, or to have a car with better gas-mileage, all 
without feeling those desires in the moment. When a desire is felt, however, it is 
accompanied by the instantiation of action tendencies that will, ceteris paribus, 
bring about her desired state of affairs: all things being equal, desiring chocolate 
will result in Zoe attempting to procure chocolate. Whether her motivational 
tendencies are actually acted upon, though, will depend not only on Zoe’s desire 
for chocolate, but on her other (potentially conflicting) desires, beliefs, goals, 
17 Whether this is changing the sensory-motor representation of the painful experience (hence 
eliciting a “pure” affective response to the new sensory representation) or is impacting the 
emotional appraisal itself is a question of some debate. See Ellingsen et al, 2013. 
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intentions, and expectations—being primed to obtain chocolate might not result in 
action if Zoe has a strong competing desire to avoid sugar or believes that chocolate 
will be deleterious to her health.  
Notice that because felt desires can take on any target, we should expect 
them at times to be classified in ordinary language-use as kinds of emotions, and at 
other times as kinds of moods. When the target of one’s motivated appraisal is 
apparent (when one wants that piece of chocolate), that desire might be described 
in emotional terms like “lust” or “yearning:” Zoe is feeling lustful towards the 
chocolate because the chocolate is good-seeming to her and she is now primed to 
get it. But felt desires can also be mood-like, insofar as they sometimes take on 
nebulous or unclear targets. Early pangs of hunger or thirst are prime examples of 
this, since one may feel motivation to find something to slake one’s thirst or hunger 
without know what, exactly, that thing might be (hence the tendency to stand in 
front of one’s refrigerator prospecting about different possible targets). Similarly, 
so-called moods of “restlessness” and “ennui” are often accompanied by 
motivations to do something, without a clear targeting in mind.18 
 
V. DEBATES AND PUZZLES  
18 In recent years it has become apparent that distinct subcortical networks correspond with 
everyday use of the word “desire.” One is “liking,” which involves phenomenally accessible 
positive valence (e.g. that chocolate looks good); the other is “wanting” or “having an urge,” 
which is associated with action tendencies and can dissociate from positive valence (Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2008, 2013). For instance, an addict might want a potent, life-ruining drug, and feel 




This dissertation is, as the title of the chapter would indicate, all about affect. And 
now, we have a general (hopefully uncontroversial) working characterization of 
what affect is, how it comes about, and what makes our folk-concepts of affect 
distinct in theory. From here, we will focus on what affect does. Over the years, a 
number of interesting puzzles and debates have cropped up around how the 
affective system interacts with and impacts other cognitive capacities. These 
debates include questions about the role of affect in learning, memory, decision 
making, perception, moral judgement, motivation, reasoning, biases, aesthetic 
judgment, moral responsibility—the list goes on and on. In the chapters that follow, 
I set my sights on the role of affect in three domains: the generation of empathy, 
aesthetic appreciation, and (relatedly) engagement with works of fiction.  
We experience a broad range of emotions in response to other living creatures, 
at times with great empathy. In Chapter 2, I will argue that while the ability to “feel 
as others feel” is clearly of ethical import, our current models of empathy are 
incomplete. To date, most theorists have focused on two cognitive systems as the 
foundations of empathy: emotional mirroring and perspective-taking. While 
investigations into these mechanisms answer important questions about how we 
engage with others, they largely ignore the affectively-laden underlying values that 
make us care about those others in the first place. Recent research into the effect of 
group status on emotional contagion and work on subjects with e.g. psychopathy, 
and sadism indicate that mirroring and perspective-taking is not (as some have 
implied) sufficient for explaining when empathy does and does not arise. Rather, 
these systems appear to rely initially on the valuing of others and their emotional 
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states/well-being to elicit full-blown empathy. Because values have been relatively 
overlooked in the literature, there are many pressing questions regarding their status 
as discrete mental states, how conflicting values are affectively represented, and to 
what extent we are morally responsible for their formation. By exploring a few of 
these open questions, I hope to lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive 
model of empathy. 
Unsurprisingly, our understanding of affect also has strong implications for the 
field of empirical aesthetics. Over the past several decades, researchers have 
become increasingly interested in explaining judgments of beauty. The 
“processing-fluency” view, for example, identifies aesthetic pleasure with the 
positive affect we feel when we are able to easily process an object’s perceptual 
properties. In chapter 3, I critique this theory and endeavor to highlight what it 
neglects: the importance of perceptual disfluency and negative affect. By turning to 
contemporary work on the affective mechanisms driving e.g. attention, curiosity, 
and problem-solving, I show that disfluency and the negative affect that it evokes 
are often crucial for motivating, amplifying, and sustaining ongoing aesthetic 
pleasure. I go on to argue that these elements often trigger primitive “questioning 
attitudes” such as interest, which are fundamental for genuine aesthetic 
appreciation. I have found this conception of interest to be particularly fruitful and 
am keen to delve further into the topic across a number of domains (see below).  
Finally, theoretical models of affect have had a profound impact on topics in 
aesthetics and philosophy of art. The “paradox of fiction,” for instance, is built upon 
the cognitivist premise that emotions require existence-beliefs, i.e. that to be truly 
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afraid of, say, a bear, one must believe that said bear poses an extant threat. Since 
engaging with fiction does not seem to entail such existence-beliefs, many 
philosophers have argued that our apparently emotional responses to fiction are 
paradoxical. In chapter 4, I address this paradox by arguing that affective states do 
not require judgements of truth (i.e. belief) in order to count as instances of real 
and/or theoretically rational emotion.  I draw upon empirical findings on the 
recruitment of affect in counterfactual mind-wandering and prospection to 
demonstrate that the affective system routinely appraises the seeming goodness and 
badness of imagined scenarios, even when we know those scenarios are not real.  
Many of the themes that I have tackled in these chapters while exploring 
aesthetics and moral psychology also have broader ramifications in philosophy of 
mind. Moving forward, I look forward to continuing my research on the ways in 
which affect drives understanding. In philosophy of science, understanding is often 
associated with the application of laws of logic, rules of inference, principles of 
causality, etc., and the “coherence” that these provide to make understanding 
possible. But, relatively few theorists have considered the extent to which 
emotional appraisals both spur our efforts to understand, and serve as internal 
indicators of the success or failure of those explanatory models. Given my current 
work on the motivational role of affect, the significance of underlying values, and 
recent findings on information-gathering tendencies in human and non-human 
animals, I want to develop the claim that affective states deeply impact our ability 
to learn, solve problems, and exercise willpower. This work on understanding 
should also challenge and amend leading theories of general intelligence and 
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willpower—which often focus primarily on the impact of working memory and 
executive function, respectively—by showing that these capacities are moderated 
by how affectively interesting and valuable one finds a particular task (or tasks in 
general) to be. This thesis should be empirically testable, and if plausible will have 









It is standard practice across the disciplines to hedge any discussion of empathy 
with a caveat: empathy is difficult to define. Because our everyday folk conception 
of empathy captures a wide range of cognitive capacities, theorists have developed 
two broad research programs to study the phenomenon. Specifically, they have set 
their sights on exploring two different kinds of so-called empathy: (1) “affective 
empathy” and (2) “cognitive empathy.” As the name might indicate, (1) “affective 
empathy” refers to the mere tokening of shared affect. On this characterization, to 
empathize one must simply instantiate another person’s emotional state first-
personally, i.e., one must feel that emotion oneself. By contrast, (2) cognitive 
empathy is characterized as an instance of vicariously shared affect. This requires 
not only that one feel another’s emotion, but that one represent and understand the 
other person’s experience as such. In general, then, empathy is commonly assumed 
to have two primary components: an affective component (the ability to share the 
emotions of another), and a cognitive component (the ability to understand the 
perspective of another).  
The schemas proposed above have, no doubt, proven empirically fruitful. 
Over the years, countless empirical studies and theoretical advancements have 
improved our grasp of the mechanisms driving (1) shared affect (affective empathy) 
and (2) vicariously shared affect (cognitive empathy), respectively. Affective 
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empathy, for instance, is often equated with neurological mirroring, emotional 
contagion, and other forms of “low-level” emotional recognition. Research in this 
domain has taught us much about the complex ways in which human beings 
unwittingly detect, experience, and respond to others’ emotional expressions and 
behavioral cues. At the same time, our understanding of cognitive empathy has 
been enriched by both scientific and philosophical work on “mindreading,” or the 
ability to attribute mental states to others. Since cognitive empathy requires that we 
feel others’ emotions in light of those others’ e.g. beliefs, goals, desires, etc., 
establishing how those representations are tokened is an important step in 
demystifying the nature of vicarious affective sharing. 
To date, theorists interested in explaining empathy have largely focused 
their attention on these two domains. And that is a good thing, since mirroring and 
mindreading clearly contribute to the sharing of affect (vicarious or otherwise)! 
But, while these mechanisms may very well be crucial for empathy, they do not 
fully explain it. As it stands, most models of empathy highlight the ways in which 
mirroring and mindreading lead to empathy as stand-alone processes. It is 
important to note, however, that mirroring and mindreading do not arise in a 
bubble. As we will see throughout this chapter, people are not always prone to (1) 
“catch” others’ feelings, nor do they reliably (2) take others’ perspectives.  If 
these capacities are fundamental for empathy—as seems to be the case—then a 
robust explanatory framework ought to address why they are differentially 
instantiated. Nor do these mechanisms, on their own, suffice for empathy, whether 
affective or cognitive. They need not only to be triggered, but maintained. What, 
then, is missing in this picture? 
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For a more complete structural model of empathy, I propose that we must 
turn our attention to the ways in which human beings both assess and value the 
world around them. To that end, I argue that in order to fully account for how 
empathy arises, we must integrate our understanding of the complex affective 
appraisal system that drives our emotional reactions. In section II, I will briefly 
review the literature on mirroring and mindreading to show how these systems 
work, and what they do and do not contribute to empathy. In section III, I describe 
how the affective-appraisal system seem to function, with special emphasis on what 
I will call “underlying values” and valence. Along the way, I aim to resolve some 
theoretical disagreement over the nature of valence by arguing that it represents a 
single axis of seeming-goodness and seeming-badness. With these pieces in place, 
in section (IV) I use the process of affective appraisal to explain both pathological 
and everyday failures to empathize—an explanation we cannot provide, I will 
show, without appealing to the appraisal system. In the hopes of motivating further 
investigation, conclude in section IV by raising a number of open questions about 
how our underlying values are set.  
 
II. SHARED AFFECT & VICARIOUSLY SHARED AFFECT 
As I mentioned from the outset, there is little doubt that mirroring and mindreading 
play important roles in the generation of empathy. But, of course, they do not just 
contribute to empathy: both are complex cognitive processes in and of themselves. 
Before we examine the ways in which our underlying values impact these systems 
through affective appraisal (see section IV), we should first briefly review what 
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they entail. Specifically, we should look to both empirical and philosophical 
research on the unique ways in which mirroring and perspective-taking are thought 
to contribute to our experience of others.  
 
A. MIRRORING 
Let’s start with the phenomena of “mirroring.” For several decades now, it has been 
noted that observing another’s action and performing that same action can produce 
strikingly similar patterns of neurological activity (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Keysers, 2010). When an observer witnesses someone filling a coffee cup, for 
instance, many regions of the observer’s brain will activate as if she were pouring 
the coffee herself. Neurons that are equally responsive while observing an action 
and performing it are often referred to as “mirror neurons.”  
Early empirical work on this phenomenon suggests that primates have a 
strong tendency to neurologically mirror goal-directed activities, i.e. grasping, 
holding, reaching, etc. (di Pellegrino et al, 1992). More recently, fMRI have 
revealed these “mirror-like” neurological responses in human beings, especially in 
the premotor cortex, the supplementary motor area, and the primary somatosensory 
cortex (Molenberghs, 2009; for review see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These 
regions of the brain are associated with spatial and sensory guidance of movement, 
the planning of actions, and proprioception, i.e. representations of one’s own body.  
Because of this mapping, it has been suggested by some that mirror neuron 
activation might help us apprehend the intentions and goals of others.  On this view, 
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offline activation of the motor-plans we observe in others enables us to represent 
and accurately predict how those others will behave (Iacoboni et al, 2005).  
Although it is not clear that action mirroring does in fact give rise to these 
insights,1 it does likely function as a priming function for first-person action (Byrne, 
1998). Most research on this topic emphasizes the idea that mirroring occurs outside 
of conscious awareness. For our purposes here, however, it is important to point 
out that mirroring is also often accessible to consciousness awareness; when this 
occurs, it may indeed provide significant insight into what it is like to be in 
another’s shoes. Think, for instance, of observing someone else as they perform a 
particularly high-stakes or difficult action, e.g. watching a friend as she tries to 
extract a poorly placed wooden block in a game of Jenga (one that is particularly 
difficult to extricate). When fully attentive in such a situation, one is likely to not 
merely exhibit neurological mirroring and activate similar action-plans offline, but 
to feel that mirroring in one’s hands, to fight an occurrent impulse to extract the 
block oneself, and to otherwise have an embodied sense of what it would be like to 
be performing that difficult task. In other words, offline and unconscious mirroring 
can quickly come conscious. This is particularly salient when observing those who 
fail to properly execute a goal-oriented action. For example, while intently 
watching someone try to e.g. stay vertical on a balance beam, one may quickly feel 
1 Many scholars have suggested that this kind of mirroring does not actually provide us with 
information about others’ mental states. Rather, they suggest, this neurological activity may arise 
as a repercussion of having already represented others e.g. goals and intentions (Csibra 2007, 
Hickok 2008 and 2014). 
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and sometimes even physically enact the urge to reorient one’s own body to correct 
for the other’s lack of balance.2 
Notably, we do not only mirror actions. We also appear to mirror affectively 
laden sensations (e.g. pain and pleasure) and affective states such as emotions and 
moods. Upon seeing someone sustain an injury, for instance, human beings tend to 
represent both the intensity of the other’s pain and the bodily location of that 
damage in their own sensorimotor systems (de Vignemont & Jacob, 2012). And, 
importantly, we appear to mirror not only sensorimotor components of pain, but the 
affective components as well. That is to say, when we mirror someone’s painful 
experience, we do not just represent where it would be in our bodies, but how bad-
seeming or unpleasant that feeling would be.3 This may explain why we reflexively 
tense our muscles and prepare to pull away when seeing e.g. a syringe pierce 
another’s arm.  
There is also strong evidence that mirror neurons are responsive to 
emotional states via “emotional mimicry” or “emotional contagion.” Quite often, 
the “contagious crying” is held up as a paradigm instance of this phenomena, 
wherein infants cry in response to the crying of other infants (Geangu et al., 2010). 
Remarkably, newborns cry significantly more in response to infants in distress than 
they do to white noise, synthetic crying sounds, or even recordings of the their own 
2 Importantly, all of this mirroring can happen swiftly and unwittingly. It does not require that an 
agent represent another’s mind as such.  
3 In section IV, we will take a much closer look at what affect actually entails. For now, 
characterizing it as the “good/bad-seeming” or “pleasant/unpleasant” quality of any given 
experience will suffice. 
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crying (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Martin & Clark (1987).4 This is not unique to 
newborns. Even adults spend their days subtly and inadvertently imitating the 
emotional facial expressions and body language of those around them (Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999; Hess et al, 2011). Often, these bouts of mimicry seem to be 
accompanied by an experience of the emotion that is being mimicked, possibly 
through a mechanism of afferent feedback (Hatfield, 1994). On this account, when 
one mimics a friends’ e.g. facial expressions of sadness, that physical mirroring 
results in the feeling of that friend’s sadness or something close to it. Using fMRI 
data, Hennenlotter et al. (2009) seems to confirm this theory by demonstrating that 
amygdala activation (associated with emotion) is attenuated during imitation of 
others’ facial expressions when Botox-induced paralysis prevent people from 
frowning. 
In light of this research, mirroring and affective contagion certainly do seem 
like a basic kind of empathy, i.e. affective empathy. And it is not at all uncommon 
to describe them as such. In their own work on empathy, theorists such as Jesse 
Prinz and Paul Bloom explicitly define empathy merely as one’s “ability to feel as 
others feel.” As such, they would ipso facto include conscious action mirroring and 
contagion as instances of so-called empathy (Prisnz, 2011; Bloom, 2016). 
Similarly, Stueber refers to mirror neurons as mechanisms of “basic empathy,” 
insofar as they seem to allow us to directly apprehend and experience others’ mental 
states (Stueber, 2006). 
4 It is unclear, however, whether such cases are genuine instances of affective mirroring. When 
an infant hears the sounds of another agent in distress, that may very well be unpleasant and 
highly distressing. As such, the infants crying may be a result of personal distress and displeasure 
about the pain of others, i.e. it might be prosocial concern and not outright mirroring. 
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These processes do not, however, suffice for our more robust conception of 
empathy as vicarious sharing of affect—a characterization that is also commonly 
embraced throughout the literature.5 Since the mirroring of basic actions has been 
observed in primates, songbirds (Prather & Mooney, 2014), and possibly canines 
(Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007), it presumably lacks sensitivity to other agent’s 
context-setting e.g., beliefs, desires, explicit reasons, etc. That is to say, it does not 
demand or produce understanding of other agents’ perspectives as such. This is also 
the case with “emotional mimicry.” When an individual “catches” another’s 
expression and feeling of e.g. joy, that contagion need not occur in light of the 
other’s psychological states. In fact, pure “emotional contagion” does not even 
require that one consciously differentiate between self and other, nor attribute that 
emotion to another agent—one must simply experience the affect first-personally. 
As such, mirroring fails to suffice for a more robust conception of empathy, i.e. 
vicarious empathy.  
 
B. PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 
In order for one to vicariously share another’s emotional state, it looks as though 
one must be able to not only feel as they feel, but understand or represent that they 
have tokened a particular affective state for a particular set of reasons. This is why 
work on mindreading is so crucial to the project at hand. In the theory of mind 
literature, “perspective-taking,” “mentalizing,” and “mindreading” all refer to one’s 
ability to attribute mental states to others (Friedman & Leslie, 2004). This capacity 
5 Indeed, the vicarious affective sharing is especially relevant to moral philosophers, clinical 
psychologists, and cognitive psychologists alike. 
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is often described in everyday language as the ability to “put oneself in another’s 
shoes.” But, it is critical to note from the start that this characterization can be 
somewhat misleading. For, while we often think of “perspective-taking” as a 
deliberative or willful action—a conscious effort to “step into another’s shoes”—
imputing others’ mental states is not always a conscious act.  
Take the classic Sally-Anne task, a psychological test intended to measure 
one’s ability to attribute false-beliefs to others. In paradigm iterations of this test, 
the subject is shown a skit involving two agents. Agent 1, Sally, takes a marble, 
hides it in her basket, and then exits the room. While she is away, Agent 2, Anne 
takes the marble out of Sally's basket and puts it in her own box. Sally then returns 
to the room, and the subject is asked "Where will Sally look for her marble?” If the 
subject has successfully represented Sally’s mind, she should say that Sally will 
look where she last left the marble (and not where the marble is in fact hidden). In 
this task, subjects are tested on their ability to represent mental states such as goals, 
epistemic access or knowledge, and consequent false beliefs. (Baron-Cohen, Leslie 
& Frith, 1985). And, relevantly, one could easily expand this paradigm to include 
the attribution of affective mental states. If asked the question “How will Sally feel 
when she looks in her basket?” for instance, the subject should now be in a position 
to predict that Sally will be surprised or dismayed to find her marble is missing. 
Although we are clearly capable of ascribing mental states to Sally in this 
scenario in a deliberative and conscious manner, our mentalizing is often driven by 
processes outside of conscious awareness. Indeed, the average person seems to 
impute Sally’s mental states both unwittingly and without much effort or explicit 
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thought. This is why there is considerable consensus that mindreading can occur 
either  consciously, slowly, and reflectively or unconsciously, quickly, and 
automatically, depending on one’s circumstances (Sperber, D. & Wilson, D., 2002; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Friedman, O. & Leslie, A.M., 2004; Kovács et al., 2010; 
Carruthers, 2008).  How we should conceive of mindreading on the whole, however, 
and how we should characterize its outputs to conscious and unconscious 
awareness, is a matter of considerable controversy (for a review see e.g., Davies 
and Stone 1995). 
There are, roughly, two large families of theories that attempt to model the 
causal mechanisms which allow us to interpret, explain, predict, and otherwise 
understand other agents. These are theory-theory and simulation theory. The 
theory-theorists posits that mindreading relies on the deployment of a “theory” or 
set of inferences about how mental states and agents operate; depending on the 
theorist, the mechanisms of that “theory” formation might be domain specific or 
domain general, and the theory might learned or innate, implicit or explicit.6 
Notably, theory-theorists are quite clear about what this process of mindreading 
yields us. On these accounts, mentalizing provides us with information about 
others’ mental states. By way of illustration, imagine that while at the library, you 
see a student looking over his graded essay; as you draw near, a cursory glance at 
his papers reveals a large “F” scrawled in red ink, followed by a bevy of comments 
from the instructor. In this case, simply registering e.g. the student’s failing grade 
and the comments in red, in tandem with knowing how people generally respond 
6 Since theory-theory is not the focus of this paper, we will leave questions of e.g. empiricism and 
nativism, modularity and domain-generality to one side. 
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to bad news, leads us to infer or judge that he is sad. Of course, we may (and often 
do) also neurologically mirror the student’s sorrowful expression, a response that 
would presumably feed into this inferential process, but visual stimuli and mirroring 
are not necessary for mindreading on the theory-theorists account. 
By contrast, simulation theorists argue that mindreading is achieved by 
cognitively “reenacting” the mental processes of others first-personally. On this 
view, one comes to represent others’ mental states by simulating their 
circumstances, and then computing over those pretend or imaginary states offline 
as one would first-personally.7 According to simulation theorists like Goldman 
(2006), mind-readers must then access the offline outputs of these simulations so 
that they can be projected onto the individual being simulated. To put it more 
systematically, in order to mentalize about our sorrowful student, one would need 
to (i) represent the particulars of his situation (e.g. seeing the bad grade in front of 
him), (ii) feed those representations offline into the appropriate cognitive 
mechanisms (those, for example, that generate emotional responses), (iii) directly 
access8 the output of those mechanisms either consciously or consciously  
(representations of sorrow), and then (iv) attribute that output to the student.  
7 If simulations of e.g. affect were not usually offline, the story goes, they would presumably 
result in an immediate, first-person experience of emotion in that moment. In short, all 
simulationist mindreading would result in first-hand experience rather than representation of 
others’ emotions. 
8 Not all simulation theorists think that we need to introspect these states per se. On a more 
radical version of simulation theory, Gordon (1995: 54) has argued that simulation is not “a 
transfer but a transformation.” That is to say, we do not pretend to be the person we are 
mindreading, but rather indexically become that person. Whether simulation requires 
introspection or not, both accounts emphasize that we use our own cognitive processes to 
simulate other’s minds, and that this is what lets us represent and understand them. 
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At this juncture, two things are worth noting. First—whether mindreading 
entails inferences, simulations, or both—when these processes are unconscious, 
they do not automatically give rise to the experience of other’s emotions. In the case 
of theory-theory, the set of inferences that we use to deduce others’ mental states 
need not result in anything like feeling what they feel. While tokened 
representations of the student as sorrowful may of course cause subsequent sadness, 
whether or not the mere representation will lead to vicarious sharing is an open 
question. The same is true of simulation theory. As stipulated by their own models, 
simulation requires one to register that one’s own affective system is activated, 
often without feeling that activation as an occurrent emotion. This is likely one of 
the reasons that simulationists have placed such emphasis on mirroring (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998). In fact, some have characterized mirror neurons as the primary 
“automatic mechanism” by which simulation occurs, since they often seem to 
operate “below the threshold of consciousness, and can be detected only by brain-
oriented techniques, commonly, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).” 
(Shanton & Goldman, 2010).9 
Second, (and as a consequence of the first) it is apparent that mindreading 
must be engaged with consciously in order to give rise to vicariously shared affect. 
For, it is not enough to merely represent another’s experiences (via an unconscious 
process), and then feel them for whatever reason.10 Rather, vicarious sharing 
9 Though, as I have explained above and will reiterate later, I think there is good reason to 
suppose that mirroring is in fact often accessible to conscious awareness and can cause at least 
shared affect when triggered.  
10 One could, for instance, mentalize about a villain’s failed attempt to take over the world and 
represent that he is sad, and then feel sad for unrelated reasons. Surely, this is not an act of 
empathy on any reading.  
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demands that we feel others’ e.g. affective states in light of consciously accessible 
information about the generation of those feelings. That is to say, it is not enough 
to know that the student is sad, we must explicitly know why the student is sad and 
what it would be like (again, in conscious awareness) to feel as the student feels. 
Conscious access to these causal stories and phenomenology are clearly dependent 
on our mindreading capacities, but it is not only a mindreading process. 
Presumably, to meet the criteria set by vicariousness, one must actively mindread 
(again, whether via theory, simulation, or both) through acts of imagination and 
pretense. 
A great deal of philosophical and empirical literature has explored the ways 
in which acts of imagination and pretense seem to engage the affective system and 
thus produce occurrent emotion (see e.g. Nichols (2004, 2006); Weinberg, & 
Meskin (2006); Meskin & Weinberg (2003); Schroeder & Matheson, 2006).11 This 
is, in fact, the one area in which theorists have quite thoroughly explored the role 
of the affective system as it relates to empathy. Importantly, however, the affective 
system does not—as current models of empathy seem to suggest—simply activate 
in response to imagined input from our mirroring and mindreading systems. Rather, 
the affective system plays a crucial role in both triggering those systems and 
sustaining them.  As we will see throughout the rest of this chapter, without 
affectively valuing others as worthy of concern or interest, there simply is no 
empathy.   
11 11 Indeed, the relationship between imagination and emotion has generated quite a bit of 
controversy in Aesthetics. See chapter 4 for more on the “Paradox of Fiction.” See also the 
“Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” in e.g. (Moran, 1994); Gendler, 2000) 
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III. AFFECTIVE-APPRAISAL & UNDERLYING VALUES
The ability to psychologically distinguish between e.g., positive and negative, good 
and bad, pleasurable and unpleasurable, is fundamental to just about everything that 
we do. Valuing things in these ways impacts the decisions we make, what we pay 
attention to, the products we buy, who we fall in love with, what we find beautiful 
and ugly, etc. And, as we will see in the next section, whether or not we empathize 
with others (either through so-called affective or cognitive empathy) relies very 
much on how we value others and the world around us. But, what are the cognitive 
mechanisms that make these assessments possible? Where does this subjective 
valuing come from? 
A. APPRAISAL AND VALENCE
In the previous chapter, we saw that the term “affect” includes a number of 
seemingly disparate psychological phenomena. These include emotions of joy, fear, 
and disgust; moods such as ennui, depression, and contentedness; sensory pleasures 
and pains such as those that accompany massages and toothaches; and desirous 
feelings like yearning and repulsion. We also saw that while there is some 
disagreement about what criteria might individuate these states, they share at least 
one thing in common: valence.12 Valence is what contributes the phenomenal 
quality of goodness or badness, pleasantness or unpleasantness, attractiveness or 
aversiveness to all of these states (see Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1990; Solomon 
12 They all also presumably involve concerted changes in (i) physiology, (ii) phenomenology (ii) 
and motivation. For a more thorough review of affect, see chapter 1. 
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and Stone, 2002; Russell, 2003; Charland, 2005; Colombetti, 2005; Barrett, 2006). 
So understood, valence is the mechanism through which our brains represent the 
positive or negative value of things in the world. 
At a basic level of description, our ability to derive this value is driven by 
affective appraisal. Simply put, affective appraisal is the process through which one 
determines the subjective significance of any given situation, event, or object. Take, 
for instance, the experience of spotting a wild rhino while roaming around Serengeti 
National Park as the sun rises. If one is ill-advisedly roaming alone, and stumbles 
upon the large animal abruptly, one will likely appraise the situation as dangerous. 
Once that significance is computed, subsequent changes to physiology, 
motivational tendencies, and phenomenology (including negative valence, or bad-
seemingness) will ensue, all of which contribute to one’s overall feelings of fear or 
panic. If, on the other hand, one comes across the same rhino while safely tucked 
away in the armored vehicle of a guided wildlife expedition, one would likely 
appraise that situation as a good opportunity. After all, seeing a rhino in the wild is 
now an extremely rare and privileged experience! This appraisal would issue forth 
in different changes to one’s physiology, motivation, and phenomenology 
(including positive valence, or good-seemingness), most likely to those states we 
associate with joy or excitement.  
It is worth pointing out that in these scenarios, the appraisal system 
determined significance and produced valence along two different dimensions. In 
the first instance, the situation was appraised in terms of harm and benefit, i.e. the 
rhino was appraised as harmful or dangerous, which gave rise to negative valence 
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(the situation seemed bad). In the second scenario, however, the situation was 
significant because it was conducive to the appraiser’s goals, i.e. the rhino was 
appraised as an opportunity, which gave rise to positive valence (the situation 
seemed good). Since the notion of affective appraisal was first suggested by Magda 
Arnold in 1960, many different structural dimensions of assessment have been 
proposed. Arnold herself argued that eliciting circumstances can be evaluated as 
good or bad, present or absent, and easy to attain or avoid. But, over the years these 
lists have grown. Lazarus (1991), for instance, proposed six different structural 
dimensions of assessment, including goal-relevance, goal-congruence or 
incongruence, type of ego-involvement, blame or credit, coping potential, and 
future expectancy. And Scherer et al. (2001) have gone so far as to propose that our 
appraisals arise along sixteen different dimensions, including e.g. moral 
significance. 
Regardless of how one classifies and individuates these dimensions, it is 
clear that valence is produced in light of some standing considerations, including 
but not limited to things like safety, pleasure, social standing, etc. In the vast 
majority of cases, more than one of these considerations will come into play. When 
one walks out of the bush and stumble across the rhino standing meters away, for 
instance, one might appraise its horn as dangerous and (if the rhino is particularly 
unkempt) as disgusting. These appraisals bring with them different action tendencies 
(i.e. run away and do not touch that, respectively), but both appraisals activate the 
same regions of the brain associated with negative valence and thus feel bad (Levy 
& Glimcher, 2012). And, of course, one can also appraise a single situation along 
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different dimensions, even when the valenced outputs of those appraisals conflict 
wildly. From the safety of one’s guided tour, one might appraise the rhino as a good 
opportunity, but also evaluate the situation as morally bad insofar as the rhino’s 
solitary presence is a reminder of the species’ decline.13  
Certainly, all of the appraisals that we have mentioned so far can arise 
through conscious processing. One might consciously contemplate e.g., how seeing 
the rhino will fulfil a life-long dream, or how one’s friends will be envious of these 
amazing adventures! But, appraisals can also be unconscious. Our evaluations do 
not just assign value to whatever we happen to be attending to: they also help direct 
our attention to things that are potentially relevant to us. In order for that to happen, 
the appraisal system must be sensitive to environmental cues that lie outside of 
focal awareness; these appraisals act as an “interruption mechanism” that alerts us 
to possible threats, sources of pleasure, opportunities, and so on (Kirby & Smith). 
Notice that as before, our conscious and unconscious appraisals may at times 
conflict. As one views the rhinoceros in relative safety, they may consciously 
appraise how great everything is, while nonetheless feeling a sense of subtle 
nervousness in the rhino’s presence. In this scenario, one might consciously 
appraise that the rhino is safe (good), while unconsciously appraising the approach 
of a large, powerful animal to be unsafe (bad).  
13 To complicate matters further, it is also the case that for any single situation or object, the 
targets of one’s appraisals may nonetheless be unique. One could, for example, appraise the 
rhino’s form or shape as good on dimensions of attractiveness (its shape is beautiful), but its 
grimy horn as bad on the same dimensions (its horn is ugly). In one sense, the targets of these 
appraisals are different, but they can contribute to one’s overall appraisal of the rhino. 
47
The fact that we seem to hold different appraisals and clashing valence 
representations at the same time raises something of a puzzle for theorists working 
on affect. Namely, how is conflicting valence possible? As I explained in chapter 
1, many researchers have characterized valence as a “common currency” that 
signals positivity or negativity. As such, valence is taken to represent a single axis 
of goodness and badness, one that gets instantiated across all instances of affect. 
And, as it stands, there is strong evidence in favor of this view. Empirical 
investigations into the matter reveal that all pleasant experiences, e.g. eating 
strawberries, listening to symphonies, earning extra money, being socially praised, 
etc., activate the same positive valence networks of the brain (for a review, see 
Cabanac, 1992). It has also been argued that valence must be a singular measure of 
goodness and badness, insofar as it enables us to make both conscious and 
unconscious decisions between options that seem otherwise incommensurate (e.g. 
deciding between staying home to eat strawberries or going to the symphony) (Levy 
& Gilmcher, 2012). But, returning to our working example, if the rhino-qua-threat 
is bad, the rhino-qua-opportunity is good, and the rhino-qua-moral concern is bad, 
how can we physically token all of that valence at once? 
 Some have tried to resolve this issue by claiming that we actually have 
multiple kinds of valence: one for e.g., money, another for power, another for 
pleasure and pain, etc., each corresponding roughly to different dimensions of 
appraisal (for a review of this debate, see Shuman, Sander & Scherer, 2013). While 
there is some evidence that different dimensions of appraisal arise along different 
neural pathways, this is no reason, I propose, to think of valence as occurring along 
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multiple axes. To begin with, positing different kinds of valence does not actually 
solve the problem of mixed emotions. After all, one might appraise the purchase of 
a new gold watch as monetarily bad-seeming in the short term, but monetarily 
good-seeming in the long run when viewed as a financial investment. Because these 
“money-valenced” appraisals would themselves conflict, we are still left with the 
problem of explaining how conflicting valence could co-occur. 
My suggestion is this: valence is a single-axis “common currency,” but it 
does not, in fact, co-occur. Rather, as our attention rapidly vacillates, the appraisal 
system outputs representations of valence successively—e.g. this rhino is 
dangerous (bad), this rhino is novel (good), this rhino is a morally sad thing (bad), 
then back to this rhino is dangerous (bad), and so on. Crucially, however, even if 
these valences are not simultaneously tokened, we should expect them to produce 
a fluid, overall sensation of “mixed feelings” in conscious awareness. 
To start, when different dimensions of appraisal are engaged, we know that 
they result in differential activation of physiological and motivational tendencies. 
Appraising the rhino as dangerous (bad) will activate systems that prime us to flee, 
while appraising the rhino as novel (good) will prime us to approach. Importantly, 
though, each of these priming trajectories will remain residually activated, even as 
appraisals shift. Consider, for instance, what happens when you are startled by your 
beloved pet, Fluffy. At first, Fluffy’s sudden appearance is appraised as unexpected 
and potentially dangerous (bad), thus triggering heightened physiological arousal 
and action tendencies to flee. Of course, you know that Fluffy is not dangerous, and 
shift your appraisals quickly…but, flight-or-flight tendencies can be quite slow to 
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extinguish. Even when you no longer actively represent Fluffy as dangerous (bad) 
in the moment, it can take a while for one’s heart rate to slow and a sense of calm 
to return. These extended, bodily ramifications of appraisal will contribute to one’s 
overall sense of an emotion persisting, even when valence has changed or flipped 
as the output of another appraisal. 
Furthermore, although representations of valence might not co-occur, one’s 
resulting experiences of good- and bad-seemingness can in principle be seamlessly 
integrated into one’s overall phenomenology. By analogy, think of what it feels like 
to observe a fabric that shimmers with a green-blue hue. When we see this fabric, 
our eyes pick up wavelengths of light that typically correspond to one of two unique 
perceptual experiences, blue and green respectively. At any given point on the 
fabric at any given time, only one wavelength of light can be reflected; that 
reflection (and hence input to the visual system) changes continuously and in 
succession. And yet, despite this constant shifting of perceptual information, we are 
left with the sensation of looking at fabric that is both green and blue. This is, I 
propose, similar to what occurs in the case of valence. Because the appraisal process 
entails rapid-fire shifts in attention along multiple dimensions of appraisal, it likely 
results in rapid-fire vacillations of the valence network.14 But vacillations in 
valence need not result in millisecond-by-millisecond changes in phenomenology: 
we can expect them to give rise to an overall feeling of mixed emotion that ebbs 
and flows over time. Moreover, our experiences of conscious valence (as felt 
through e.g. emotions) can be stored in working memory, such that even when they 
14 Unfortunately, given current technological limitations, we do not have clear enough temporal 
resolution in our measurements of affect to test this hypothesis empirically. 
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are no longer conscious, they can still impact our higher-order judgments about our 
own emotional states. 
 
B. UNDERLYING VALUES 
As we have just seen, dimensions of appraisal—e.g. safety, social standing, 
pleasure, morality, beauty, to name a few possibilities—set the bounds for which 
environmental stimuli will be appraised, and how they will be valenced. If the 
appraisal system were not sensitive to cues of e.g. safety and danger, then a 
rhinoceros’ sharp horns would not elicit negative valence nor eventually result in 
feelings of fear. Described in this way, dimensions of appraisal seem to function as 
our underlying values. They determine both what grabs our conscious/unconscious 
attention, and how we will emotionally respond—whether we consciously 
articulate them or endorse them as worthwhile or not. 
 This means, importantly, that underlying values are not synonymous with 
“values” as the term is used in everyday speech.  In ethics, for instance, the word 
“value” is often used to refer to one’s preferences concerning appropriate courses 
of actions or outcomes, i.e. what ought to be. As such, a value can be thought of as 
a kind of abstract commitment. When one values e.g. friendship, beauty, or hard 
work, they have set an intention to pursue or embody those abstract concepts 
wherever possible (or at very least, to not overtly flout them).15 But, of course, what 
we outwardly think ought to matter is not always what our brains (complex 
computational systems that they are) prioritize. A soldier might, for instance, find 
15 If someone is lacking in their commitment to e.g. hard work and thus rarely works hard, then 
one could reasonably object that they never “valued” it at all. 
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that an unwitting appraisal of danger and negative valence makes her feel terrified 
on the battle field, despite consciously endorsing or valuing (i.e. being committed 
to) courage. In this case, appraising the environment for signs of danger is an 
underlying value that might clash with the soldiers’ relfective values. 
This does not mean that our endorsed values have no impact on appraisal. 
Far from it! For, remember that for most of us, goal-congruence appears to be a 
highly sensitive dimension of appraisal, whether the goal is big or small, standing 
or occurrent. When one sets genuine intentions to clean the house, for instance, 
being thwarted in that endeavor feels bad (even when one is thwarted by pleasant 
circumstances, like an unexpected visit from a friend). If values are kinds of 
commitments, then breaking with those commitments should also trigger an 
appraisal. In this case, it would generate an appraisal of non-goal-congruence (bad) 
and, if bad enough, would motivate one to change their behaviors. Furthermore, 
some theorists have argued that we naturally appraise the world along dimensions 
of self-(in)congruence and moral badness/goodness. If this is true, then not acting 
in accordance with one’s consciously endorsed values would certainly suffice to 
trigger an affective appraisal, likely one resulting in e.g. shame or disappointment. 
Whatever the dimension of appraisal, this emotional akrasia (feeling bad 
about our feelings) is often potent enough to make us change course. In the 
literature on willpower, several empirical investigations have revealed techniques 
that enable us to successfully regulate our emotional appraisals (Metcalf & Mischel, 
1999). If our soldier is compelled to subdue her fear on the battlefield, for instance, 
she might (i) distract herself from whatever is generating an appraisal of threat, or 
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(ii) reframe it.  To (i) distract herself, the soldier might attend to the grass, thoughts 
of chocolate, memories from her childhood, i.e. she could think of anything other 
than what is causing her fear. To (ii) reframe things, she might imagine, for 
instance, how her peers will admire her bravery, or how sad and disappointed her 
family will be if she lets them down: she is still attending to the initial target and 
cause of her fear (impending battle), but is now deliberately trying to do so in a 
different light. 
Why do these techniques work? In both cases, it looks as though providing 
the appraisal system with new stimuli (thoughts of chocolate or social approbation) 
activates different dimensions of appraisal. Chocolate is good-seeming on 
dimensions of pleasure, and social approbation is good-seeming on dimensions of 
social standing. Affect is still being tokened, it has just shifted in dimension and 
valence. By consciously changing what we attend to and how we attend to it, we 
are often able to shift dimensions/modes of appraisal, and this brings our emotions 
in line with our more abstract values. In this sense, our underlying values and higher 
order values are deeply interconnected. 
 
IV. EXPLAINING FAILURES OF EMPATHY 
It should go without saying that the affective system is necessary for empathy. It is, 
after all, the very system by which we feel emotions. In much of the contemporary 
literature on empathy, however, affect is either treated as an obvious add-on to be 
explored in future expositions, or as an automatic consequence of engaging with 
others’ minds. Many seem to imply that we mirror others and then feel what they 
53
feel; that we imagine what it is like to be someone or pretend to be in their shoes 
and then the affective system is activated. This may very well be true…but it is not 
the entire story. There are many instances in which people (both those who have 
been clinically diagnosed with antisocial tendencies and those who have not) can 
mirror and mindread, yet fail to empathize with others. At present, most of our 
theoretical models of empathy simply do not account for these failures. Now that 
we have taken a look at how affective appraisal works and the nature of valence, 
however, we stand in a much better position to explain why this happens. 
 
A. Psychopathy  
It has long been acknowledged that psychopaths lack empathic tendencies.  Indeed, 
one of the strongest criteria of diagnosis for psychopathy in clinically-endorsed 
psychological assessment is a general callousness towards others’ feelings and an 
absence of prosocial sentiment, be it empathy or sympathy (Venables et al, 2013).  
But what, exactly, is happening at the level of cognitive architecture to cause this 
lack of empathy? In 2008, Shirley Fecteau et al. found that non-psychiatric 
psychopaths16 are quite capable of mirroring the location and intensity of other’s 
pain. Surprisingly, in fact, those who showed the greatest propensity for “cold-
heartedness” or lack of empathy showed greater sensorimotor mirroring than did 
the average participant. What these subjects did not do, however, was to “catch” or 
feel the affective component of the pain that they observed. 
16 If these were the results for non-psychiatric psychopaths, it is safe to assume that those 
meeting criteria for diagnosis would exhibit these tendencies even more robustly. 
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Why do psychopaths mirror the sensation but not the valence of others’ 
pain?17 At present, most theorists characterize affective mirroring as an “automatic 
mechanism” that leads from: (i) perception of affective cues (a frowning face, a 
needle’s injection, etc.); to the (ii) mirroring of those cues (activation of 
neurological regions associated with frowning, the needle’s injection, etc.); to (iii) 
the tokening of action tendencies (flinching) and felt valence (presumably 
negative). 18 Clearly, that process is not automatic in the case of psychopaths. Nor, 
I would argue, is it automatic for anyone. In order for mirroring of sensorimotor 
damage to give rise to valence, it has to be appraised as bad. For most of us, in our 
everyday dealings, mirroring other’s bodily harm simultaneously triggers an 
appraisal of badness. This is because most of us really do care about others and see 
their suffering as bad. But, we don’t just value or care about others in abstraction: 
for the average person, others’ wellbeing is a critical underlying value to which the 
appraisals process is highly sensitive. Conversely, when the psychopath mirrors 
sensation and not valence, it seems to be because she lacks this underlying value 
and as such does not appraise others’ pain to be bad. This breakdown in affective 
empathy is thus not the result of malfunction mirroring, it is the product of one’s 
appraisal. 
17 As we discussed in the previous chapter, affective states seem to have both affective 
(valenced) and bodily (sensorimotor) components. Morphine, for instance, has been shown to 
drastically lessen the seeming-badness of physical damage to one’s body while leaving intact 
one’s representation of damage in the sensorimotor cortex. For more on this, see chapter 1. 
18 One might object that mirroring emotion via a cue like the prick of a needle is too abstract, i.e. 
that it requires the psychopath to first recognize the other’s pain and then feel it. This seems 
unlikely, since psychopaths actually perform slightly better than controls on some complex 
emotional recognition tasks. (Dolan and Fullam, 2004). 
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Psychopaths also have been shown to perform on par with normally 
functioning adults on mindreading tasks (Dolan & Fullam, 2004).  Further, Decety 
et al. (2013) have demonstrated that they appear perfectly capable of imaginatively 
taking the perspective of others to deduce their emotional states; they simply do so 
in a manner that is remarkably un-affective. This research shows that when 
imagining their own future states, psychopaths demonstrated considerably more 
activation of the anterior insula and amygdala with the orbitofrontal cortex and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex—regions of the brain associated with valenced 
appraisal and affect—than when imagining others’ experiences. That is to say, 
while psychopaths are able to represent and attribute others mental states, they do 
so without vicariously sharing in their affect. 
Importantly, this is not a failure of the appraisal system per se. As is made clear by 
this study, psychopaths do not simply lack appropriate affective appraisal across 
the board.  Indeed, individuals diagnosed with psychopathy often display 
narcissistic valence and arousal patterns; they care deeply about anything that is in 
their own self-interest, e.g. they experience intense anger in response to frustration, 
feel exaggerated personal distress, etc. (Blair, 2012; Martens 2002). When imaging 
others’ experiences, however, the psychopath does not appraise those experiences 
as good or bad, i.e. they are affectively flat. Two things might account for this 
flatness. First, it is possible that because the psychopath does not value others (in 
either the traditional or underlying sense), they do not bother to furnish their 
imaginative simulations with the kinds of rich details that trigger the affective 
system (see e.g. Moran, 1994). Or, second, it is possible that psychopathic subjects 
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did represent the other’s experience in a sensorially rich format, but that those 
representations were simultaneously tagged as not pertaining to them, and hence 
did not trigger the subject’s underlying values for affective appraisal.19 
 
B. Sadism  
Sadism is also associated with a lack of empathy. While it has been removed from 
more recent editions of the DSM, sadism is often described as a personality disorder 
in which one takes pleasure from the negative affective states of others, e.g. 
discomfort, humiliation, pain, etc. Considerably fewer empirical studies have been 
conducted on sadists’ capacities for mindreading, mirroring and the generation of 
affect. That said, there are compelling reasons to believe that sadistic individuals 
understand others’ emotional states via the same cognitive mechanisms as non-
sadistic individuals.  Indeed, it seems plausible that the sadist’s preference for 
suffering in others requires the ability to richly calculate, represent, and understand 
those emotional states; were sadists unable to do so, they would have nothing to get 
pleasure from.  In one of the few clinical studies conducted on sadism, Harenski et 
al. found that when viewing pictures of painful experiences, sadists showed greater 
activation of the amygdala (a brain area associated with strong emotion) than did 
other sexual offenders.  As compared to non-sadists, these sadists also showed 
greater correlation between the pain severity ratings of the photos and activity in 
the anterior insula: the more pain the sadist attributed to others in a particular 
19 If it is possible for the psychopath to imagine someone’s experience in vivid detail and not 
experience affect, that is noteworthy and stands in need of explanation. If underlying values or 
dimensions of appraisal really are what make us emote, then it is possible that psychopath’s 
underlying values concern only what is relevant to themselves. 
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scenario, the stronger the affective reaction.  These findings suggest that (quite 
unlike the psychopath who is predominantly indifferent to the suffering of others) 
the sadist is highly attuned to others’ experiences. 
It seems likely, then, that the sadist has access to all of the same 
informational content (accrued through sensorimotor mirroring and perspective-
taking) as anyone else. What distinguishes the sadist from non-sadistic individuals 
is how they appraise that information. As we have established, representations of 
pain in others usually triggers swift appraisals of badness. When sadists detect that 
another is in pain or otherwise subjugated, however, that input to the appraisal 
system results in positive valence.  But, how is this possible? The underlying value 
or appraisal dimension that is sensitive to pain and pleasure for oneself presumably 
functions typically in people who systematically enjoy harming others, i.e. they do 
not flip their appraisals of pain and pleasure and become masochists themselves. 
So, why appraise others’ pain as good? 
I suspect that unlike psychopaths, sadists do not fundamentally lack an 
underlying value that is sensitive to other’s wellbeing. Sexual sadist, for instance, 
derive pleasure from others’ suffering, but presumably do so only in the context of 
sexual acts; they are still capable of empathizing with others in their daily lives. So, 
why do sexual sadists not feel the pain of others in sexualized scenarios? Some 
have proposed that human beings are naturally inclined to evaluate the world on 
dimensions of power, control, or personal agency (Scherer, 2009). That is to say, 
some claim that the appraisal system is constantly scanning for cues that indicate 
one’s social rank, personal influence over others, access to resources, and so on. I 
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suggest that sadists actually appraise others’ suffering in light of this underlying 
value. For whatever reason,20 sadists appraise others’ expressions of pain not 
primarily as cues for moral or social appraisal, but power. And, in some respects, 
the sadist is correct; causing pain in others is a signal of power over others, and 
power is generally appraised as good. For the vast majority of people, however, 
pain in others triggers appraisal along dimensions of moral and social badness, and 
so we do not appraise their pain as power (good)—quite the contrary! 
 
C. Everyday Failures 
As we have seen, theorizing about the nature of affective appraisal allows us to 
better explain those with systematically aberrant empathic tendencies. But, this 
does not just apply to atypical populations. At some point or another, all of us will 
fail to empathize or experience what is known as an “empathy gap.” I contend that 
this happens, at least in part, because our own self-interests generate affective states 
that can permeate and counteract the affect we token when imaginatively simulating 
and mirroring others’ experiences. 
 To see why this is the case, consider the fact that receiving an injection one 
considers to be useful is often reported to feel less painful than injections which 
serve no apparent purpose at all (Leknes, 2013). Why does this happen? When an 
injection is appraised as a source of occurrent damage, the sting of the needle will 
quickly produce negative valence. However, when an injection is appraised solely 
in light of its ameliorative effects, that potentially life-saving medical procedure 
20 See final section for an idea of why the sadist might differentially appraise cues like 
expressions of pain. 
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looks quite positive. Importantly, the appraisal system will iteratively appraise and 
reappraise the injection in light of (at least) these two dimensions as it is being 
administered, resulting in the generation of both positive and negative valence. 
Since these representations of valence are both projected onto the same target, i.e. 
receiving the injection, one’s overall feeling of pain is mitigated.  
I suspect that this mitigation of affect is rather common when we attempt to 
engage in cognitive empathy. Suppose my colleague has recently received a 
promotion, and I sit down to imagine what that experience was like for her. When 
I imagine this situation from my friend’s perspective (knowing how hard she has 
worked, how much she wanted to be recognized), it evokes satisfaction and 
contentment. In this case, assuming my friend is as happy as I think she is, I have 
successfully empathized. But, much can impede this process. Suppose now that my 
company famously only gives out one promotion per year. While all of this is still 
good news for my colleague, it might greatly frustrate my own goals and sense of 
self-worth, making empathy difficult. After all, when one imagines or pretends to 
be another, one is all the while aware that they are engaging in an act of imagining 
or pretense, i.e. one knows that they are appraising things as good or bad for another 
person. As I imagine what it is like to shake my boss’s hand through the perspective 
of my overjoyed colleague, I am still happy as her…but this new information 
makes intermittent appraisals of goal-incongruence and power loss much more 
likely.21 
21 This is, likely, why it can literally feel bad to try to empathize with those we find morally 
repugnant or villainous. While we can imagine what it is like to be a terrible despot living in the 
lap of luxury, understanding that that simulation is true for someone evil will generate its own 
affective appraisal. 
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In short, when we endeavor to empathize, we do not just appraise the 
contents of our imaginations. We also appraise those contents for what they 
represent at large and how they might impact us as individuals. If the valence of 
those disparate appraisals contradict one another (as was the case with the 
injection), it will undoubtedly shift the emotions we experience, making shared 
affect unlikely. All of this is to say that whether we take on the same appraisal of 
another’s circumstances as they do depends in heavy measure on the relationship 
that they bear to us and how their circumstances impact our own underlying values, 
e.g. our own safety, goals, pleasure, and so on.  
 
D. Intra and Intergroup failures 
Our underlying values around group membership seem to have an 
especially strong impact on mirroring and perspective-taking tendencies. In 2010, 
Avenanti et al. found that group membership along racial lines had a profound 
impact on the mirroring of others’ pain.  In this study, researchers showed 
participants videos of a “neutral” hand that was colored purple, the hand of a black 
person, and the hand of a white person, each of which was being pricked by a 
needle. Remarkably, participants with strong implicit racial biases mirrored the 
sensorimotor pain of the purple hand, and the hand corresponding to their own race, 
but not the hand for which they held implicit bias. Similar effects have been found 
in cases of “emotion contagion,” where i.e. mirroring expressions of fear, 
happiness, anger etc. appears to be mitigated by the extent to which one identifies 
with another’s group (Hess et al, 2011). While it is rather unfortunate that we have 
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these tendencies, it looks like actively appraising others as bad-seeming along 
dimensions of, say, social standing or social membership, is enough to prevent what 
otherwise seems to be an automatic mirroring process.  
 Over the past few decades, a growing body of research has shown just how 
impactful these appraisals of group status are. Within their first year of life, infants 
tend to show preferences for imitating those who speak the same language and 
exhibit the same appearance (usually along racial lines) as their caregivers 
(Buttelmann et al., 2013:).  By age five, these preferences turn into a tendency to 
both allocate more resources to in-group members, and to form more positive social 
expectations of those members, i.e. those who belong to one’s in-group are assumed 
to be more cooperative and better behaved (Dunham et al., 2011). Remarkably, this 
preferential appraisal of outgroup members can be impactful even when groups are 
novel, i.e. when membership is assigned randomly. And, especially germane for 
our purposes, self‐reported data indicates that when presented with photographs of 
painful experiences, people are more inclined take the perspective of those who 
they identify as belonging to the same racial group, particularly when observing 
negative emotions. (Neumann, Boyle, Chan, 2013).  
 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH 
At this point, we have seen that the affective appraisal system plays a fundamental 
role in the success and failure of empathy. By incorporating some of our best 
empirical and theoretical accounts of affect, I hope to have elaborated on our 
models of what it takes to feel as others feel, vicariously or otherwise. We have 
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seen, for instance, that having a dimension of appraisal that is sensitive to others’ 
well-being is a critical component for empathy: it impacts when we mirror and take 
others’ perspectives, and it sets our overall disposition to care for those around us. 
But, for all that this emphasis on affect illuminates, it also raises a number of 
questions. The most pressing of these questions revolves around how dimensions 
of appraisal are set and weighted. After all, if underlying values do all that they 
seem to do, then knowing how they are formed and interact is of the utmost 
importance.  
While I do not purport to answer these questions here, one area of research 
that might shed light on these questions is that which focuses on “primary” and 
“secondary” reinforcement. Primary enforcers are objects or conditions for which 
an animal has strong, genetically determined associations of pleasure (understood 
here as positive valence). These primary reinforcers are thought to be innate, and 
usually fulfil some biologically necessary function, such as food, shelter, sex, etc. 
By contrast, secondary reinforcers acquire their value through a history of learned 
association with already-valued primary reinforcers or other valued secondary 
reinforcers. To use a classic example from the literature, when one gives a dog a 
treat and tells him that he is a "good boy," the dog gets both a primary reinforcer 
(the treat, which innately tokens positive valence) and a secondary reinforcer 
(verbal praise, which is not innately valued by the dog as such). Once one’s verbal 
praise is associated with the positively valenced experience of food, that verbal 
praise begins to token positive valence for the dog, even in the absence of treats. 
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As we saw in section III, appraisal theorists have proposed a number of 
appraisal dimensions or underlying values—many more than food, water, and sex. 
That said, most of the dimensions that have been proposed do seem, if not necessary 
for human survival, optimal for survival e.g. safety/threat, pleasure/displeasure, 
goal-conduciveness, power status, social/moral standing, etc. And, since human 
beings are undoubtedly affective little creatures from the moment of birth, it makes 
sense to assume that we have some innate underlying values that help us navigate 
from the start. Indeed, infants seem disposed from very early on to e.g. respond 
fearfully to snakes and spiders (Hoehl, Hellme, Hedqvist, & Gredebäck, 2017), find 
sweet things to be pleasant (Steiner et al., 2001), plainly get frustrated when their 
own goals or wants are stymied, and are attentive to both social hierarchies 
(Thomsen, 2019) and prosocial/antisocial behaviors (Hamlin, 2013). It seems 
reasonable to suppose, then, that these dimensions of appraisal are present at birth 
and are disposed to generate the valence of a number of set primary enforcers in 
predictable ways. 
There are, admittedly, some limitations to describing human preferences in 
these terms. For instance, it is not entirely clear how primary our “primary 
reinforcers” really are. One the one hand, research suggests that evolutionary 
pressures may have hardwired the appraisal of particular stimuli to be good- or bad-
seeming, especially when they directly impact our survival as a species. Sugar 
preferences, for instance, likely evolved because sugar is an easily detectable, 
roughly accurate signal that something is edible (Ramirez, 1990). As such, 
sweetness seems to be liked by just about everyone. On the other hand, once we are 
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older and more cognitively developed, the very same stimulus—even that which 
appears to work as a primary enforcer, like sugar—can be appraised on different 
dimensions. So, although sugar triggers appraisals of sensory pleasure and positive 
valence for most people, it could easily trigger appraisals of e.g. goal-
(in)congruence if one were on a diet, or e.g., moral-wrongness if one were, say, 
suffering from an eating disorder that made the consumption of food feel morally 
repugnant. In these cases, those who do not get pleasure from sugar may still have 
an underlying value that is sensitive to pleasure in general, sugar now simply fails 
to be appraised along that dimension.22 
These worries aside, further exploration of research on e.g. associative 
learning in tandem with what we know of the appraisal system is of crucial import. 
Hopefully, by setting our sights in this direction, we will get a better grasp on 
why, for instance, the sadist appraises others’ pain as a signal of power, rather 
than a cue for social or moral distress. Or why, for instance, the psychopath 
seems to either lack or override underlying values that would otherwise lead 
her to care about others. Only when we gain traction with some of these 
unaddressed questions will we have a comprehensive theoretical model of how 
empathy works. 





DISFLUENCY, NEGATIVE AFFECT, AND INTEREST: 




Human beings ascribe beauty to an immense variety of things: masterful dances, 
haunting melodies, inviting landscapes, charming faces—the list is virtually 
inexhaustible. And yet, despite the fact that judgments of beauty abound, they 
remain remarkably enigmatic. What, exactly, is a judgment of beauty? What drives 
our feelings of aesthetic preference and pleasure across such a broad and diverse 
spectrum of stimuli? Why do we deem some objects beautiful, while others 
altogether fail to inspire appreciation?  
Of course, these are by no means new questions. Plato, Aristotle, and their 
western contemporaries famously began theorizing about aesthetics over two 
thousand years ago; since that time, we have produced an extensive body of 
literature exploring beauty’s ontological, moral, and epistemic status. In recent 
years, however, the growing field of empirical aesthetics has provided us with a 
novel, more scientific vantage point from which to consider these long-standing 
quandaries. Unlike strictly philosophical approaches, the empirical aesthetics 
project is aimed at discovering the evolutionary and cognitive foundations of 
phenomena like aesthetic pleasure and preference.1 To that end, researchers in 
1 Whether we can reduce judgments of beauty to feelings of aesthetic pleasure and 
preferability—the latter of which I take to be appraisals of “seeming goodness—is a subject of 
some debate and warrants its own treatment. For my purposes here, I will assume that 
subjective feelings of aesthetic pleasure and preference are likely intrinsic to the process of 
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empirical aesthetics often employ a three-fold, interdisciplinary approach. By 
considering relevant scientific findings in e.g. cognitive and evolutionary 
psychology, neuroscience, experimental aesthetics, etc., theorists intend to discover 
the conditions under which we are likely to make judgments of beauty (what we 
like), form a plausible theory as to why these preferences and judgments of beauty 
have evolved (why we like it), and deduce how those judgments are made at a 
cognitive level of description (how we like it). The hope is that by evaluating 
philosophical and scientific theories of beauty in tandem, we will be able to develop 
a more holistic, falsifiable, and psychologically explanatory model of our everyday 
aesthetic judgments.  
Over the past several decades, a number of promising but incomplete 
theories of aesthetic pleasure have been put forward.  Daniel Berlyne’s highly 
influential “arousal potential” view, for instance, posits that our strongest aesthetic 
preferences are directly correlated with the extent to which a stimulus causes not 
low or high, but moderate psychological arousal (Berlyne, 1971; 1974). On this 
account, a mildly complex or arousing sensory experience generally indicates that 
an organism’s environment is advantageous, and so should produce the strongest 
feelings of approbation. By contrast, Colin Martindale and Kathleen Moore 
challenge Berlyne’s take with a more cognitive explanation of aesthetic pleasure. 
Their “prototype preference” theory holds that aesthetic pleasure is not a measure 
of complexity or arousal potential per se, but of a stimulus’ typicality. That is to 
say, they posit that the more clearly and concretely a subject is able to conceptually 
judging an object as beautiful (though, for a more skeptical account, see e.g. Armstrong & 
Detweiler-Bedell, 2008.) 
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classify a perceptual stimulus, the more pleasing she will find it (Martindale & 
Moore, 1988). 
While these theories certainly elucidate some of our tendencies to regard 
stimuli as beautiful or pleasing, they unfortunately fall short of accounting for the 
aesthetic experience of beauty as a whole. To put the problem rather succinctly, 
each approach seems to fail explanatorily where the other one succeeds.2 Recently, 
however, the “processing fluency” theory of aesthetic pleasure has been suggested 
as a means both to elaborate upon what these views get right and to unify them 
under a single framework. To date, Reber and his colleagues have provided the 
most comprehensive articulation of the processing fluency theory, which holds that 
the pleasantness of aesthetic stimuli can be identified with the perceptual fluency 
those stimuli afford (see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Reber, 2012). In 
this context, perceptual fluency refers to the subjective experience of effortlessness 
one has when engaging with the perceptual features of a stimulus e.g. its form, 
color, size, etc. According to proponents of this view, when an object’s sensory 
properties are processed with ease, we tend to feel positive affect which drives our 
subjective ascriptions of beauty; when we struggle to process an object’s sensory 
properties, we find that object less pleasing and hence less beautiful. 
As I will show, Reber et al.’s work provides a model of aesthetic judgment 
that aligns better than most with a wide breadth of scientific findings on sensory 
preferences, subjective feelings of liking, and art appreciation. But, while their 
model fits well with much of the data, it is currently open to a couple of critical 
2 I will expand upon this claim further in the section that follows. 
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objections that need to be addressed. Namely, the fluency-as-pleasure view (i) fails 
to truly explain why people tend to dislike stimuli that afford extremely fluent 
processing—in Reber et al’s attempts to do so, they rely on problematic ad hoc 
description rather than theoretical explanation—and (ii) it discounts the impressive 
flexibility with which both art experts and laypeople are able to shift their 
appreciative stances. These issues arise, I will argue, primarily due to the fact that 
Reber et al.’s account ignores the crucial role of affectively-laden interest in 
eliciting aesthetic pleasure.  
 The following is intended to amend this oversight. In sections II and III 
respectively, I will lay out what the processing fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure 
successfully accomplishes, and then highlight some of its most evident 
shortcomings. Once I have established both why this view is worth building upon 
and the challenges that it faces, in section IV I will focus on developing two new 
claims. First, given contemporary work on the affective mechanisms driving e.g. 
attention, curiosity, problem-solving, etc., I will propose that interest qua primitive 
“questioning attitude” is necessary for genuine aesthetic appreciation. Second, it 
seems likely from an empirical standpoint that this questioning attitude often 
supervenes upon processing disfluency and resulting negative affective states 
which motivate, amplify, and sustain ongoing aesthetic pleasure. Together, these 
elaborations should give us a more comprehensive model of affectively-laden 
perceptual processing with the explanatory power necessary for rectifying the 
processing fluency view. 
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II. POSITIVE FEATURES OF THE ACCOUNT  
Providing a robust explanation of aesthetic pleasure is no simple task. Any 
worthwhile, scientifically-based theory of beauty must accommodate not only a 
diverse set of experimental data, but also account for a number of well-vetted 
philosophical observations about the nature of aesthetic experience. Prior to Reber 
et al.’s processing fluency view, two views about why and how we form such 
judgments were especially influential. By drawing from different scientific fields 
of research, Berlyne’s arousal-potential theory and Martindale and Moore’s 
prototype-preference theory provide unique explanatory schemata for a wide range 
of findings. As I will argue, although both of these theories leave something to be 
desired, they nicely illustrate the spectrum of phenomena that any complete theory 
of aesthetic pleasure must explain. 
The first of these, Berlyne’s arousal-potential view, posits that our aesthetic 
preferences are correlated directly with a stimulus’ capacity to cause arousal.  In 
cognitive psychology, arousal is roughly characterized as the degree of 
physiological and—of particular import for our purposes here—psychological 
excitement that an organism experiences when confronted with a stimulus.3 The 
arousal-potential view builds upon a well-established principle in the domain of 
evolutionary psychology; namely, that high and low states of arousal provide 
aversive motivational feedback to an organism. For instance, a preponderance of 
3 Compare, for instance, the phenomenal contrast between contentment and fear. When 
content, an animal’s physiological and psychological states are relatively close to baseline, e.g. its 
heart rate is regular, breathing is steady, and the animal is able to shift attention with relative 
ease; by comparison, when in a fearful state, the same animal is likely to be agitated both 
physically and mentally, e.g. its heart rate climbs, breathing will quicken, and its attention homes 
in dramatically on any potential source of negative affect (see e.g. Easterbrook, 1959). 
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highly arousing stimuli has a strong likelihood of occurring in turbulent or 
dangerous environments, while a dearth of arousing stimuli may indicate that an 
environment will provide suboptimal resources for survival. If this is the case, then 
an environment that is relatively safe yet fruitful and worth exploring should 
produce moderate psychological arousal and an accompanying sense of strong 
approbation. With this understanding in place, Berlyne reasonably concludes that 
our most intense feelings of aesthetic pleasure must have evolved to track middling 
arousal vis-a-vis moderate perceptual complexity and novelty (Berlyne, 1971; 
1974).  
The arousal-potential view both succeeds and fails on different dimensions. 
It aligns nicely, for instance, with the empirical finding that stimulus complexity is 
often related to preference by an inverted U-shaped function, i.e. it aligns with the 
average person’s preference for sensory experiences that are neither too simple nor 
too complex, neither totally alien nor overly familiar, etc. (Berlyne, 1971; Vitz, 
1966). Reducing aesthetic pleasantness to arousal-potential also allows us make 
sense of the fact that several objective sensory properties appear to be commonly 
favored in the literature on subjective liking. In a number of studies, it has been 
found that subjects prefer perceptual features such as visual clarity (Whittlesea, 
Jacoby, & Girard, 1990), symmetry (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Wurtz, 
Reber, & Zimmermann, 2008), and figure-ground contrast (Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Thompson & Ince, 2013), all of which push stimuli into a mid-
range of complexity and novelty. But, this view also has considerable problems. As 
Martindale noted, arousal potential alone cannot explain why two sources of stimuli 
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that are equally arousing can be differentially appraised. After all, if Berlyne’s 
view fully captured our preference tendencies, then a discordant cacophony should 
be just as pleasurable as a spirited melody of the same arousal-potential, but that 
does not seem to bear out in everyday experience—how we engage with sensory 
input matters as well (Martindale, 1988).  
 Martindale & Moore suggest that a more subjective, “cognitive” process is 
involved in shaping our attributions of beauty. Their prototype-preference theory 
asserts that aesthetic pleasure is not driven by arousal per se, but by a stimulus’ fit 
to central tendency of a category. In other words, the more archetypal the subject 
finds a stimulus, the more that stimulus is liked (Martindale & Moore, 1988).4 
Many studies have revealed this prototype-preference effect in aesthetic contexts. 
Research demonstrates, for instance, that perceptual properties such as color 
typicality can influence liking to a much greater extent than mere figure complexity 
(Martindale, 1990); subjects also appear to prefer paintings that are typical for a 
given artistic style, even when controlling for factors such as novelty and familiarity 
(Farkas, 2002). But, while the prototype-preference theory accommodates these 
findings and avoids some of the pitfalls of the arousal-potential model, on the whole 
its explanatory power is limited.  We are still left to wonder, for instance, why one 
would prefer prototypes in the first place; is there an evolutionary or cognitive 
account of why this tendency might come about? Further, the prototype-preference 
view struggles to explain the U-shaped function between complexity and 
4 On this view, when evaluating dog breeds, the average Westerner might prefer Labradors over 
Bull Terriers because the former more clearly resemble the abstract average of all of the 
members of our culturally shared “dog” category. 
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preference.  For instance, it is not hard to imagine a stimulus that is extremely 
simple because of its strong typicality, and hence disliked for that very reason—yet 
such distaste should not be possible if we merely favor prototypes. Finally, a theory 
that reduces aesthetic pleasure to prototypicality has a rough time explaining the 
appreciation we often feel for a staggeringly broad range of stimuli e.g. non-
representational art, abstract patterns, works that challenge genre expectations, etc.5   
 Although the arousal-potential and prototype-preference theories of 
aesthetic pleasure are imperfect, they have both added considerably to the empirical 
project at hand. By highlighting the fact that both objective sensory qualities (e.g. 
complexity or arousal-potential) and subjective cognitive processes (e.g. the 
detection of prototypicality) contribute to our feelings of aesthetic pleasure, they 
pave the way for a more comprehensive, unified theory. Recently, Reber et al. have 
led the charge in providing that more comprehensive theory with their processing-
fluency model.    
Reber and his colleagues suggest that aesthetic pleasure is ultimately a 
function of the perceiver’s processing dynamics (e.g. Reber, 2012; Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998). Specifically, they argue that a stimulus is experienced as pleasing 
or beautiful when it affords optimal levels of processing fluency. In this context, 
5 Indeed, as others have mentioned, one shortcoming of the prototype-preference theory is that 
“typicality” is hard to define beyond the particulars of a specific act of aesthetic appreciation 
(Silva, 2012). An artwork, for instance, could be typical or atypical with respect to its e.g. diverse 
formal properties, representational content, intended historical style, etc.—to simply state that 
aesthetic pleasure is a measure of “typicality” simpliciter is to ignore the fact that typicality can 
only be established within the context of cognitive framing (for a thorough philosophical 
treatment of this topic, see Walton, 1970).  I will return to this topic in sections III’s discussion of 
questioning attitudes. 
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processing fluency is best characterized in terms of the subjective feelings of ease 
or difficulty one has when processing any sort of information (Reber, Wurtz, & 
Zimmermann, 2004).6 In their account of aesthetic appreciation, however, Reber et 
al. focus almost exclusively on perceptual processing fluency, or the level of 
effortlessness we experience when engaging with strictly perceptual qualities e.g. 
form, size, tone, pitch, or any other sensory detail (Graf, Mayer, & Landwehr, 
2017). Importantly, Reber has argued elsewhere that fluent processing such as this 
is hedonically marked, i.e. fluent processing intrinsically feels good while disfluent 
processing feels bad (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Drawing 
upon the same scientific hypotheses as Berlyne, these theorists claim that fluent 
information processing results in positive affect because “high fluency 
signals…that things are familiar and the ongoing cognitive processes are running 
smoothly, whereas difficulty of ongoing processing signals that things are not going 
well.” (Reber, 2012, p.227). Putting all of these observations together, the 
processing fluency view of aesthetic judgments holds that we find an object 
beautiful because the fluent processing thereof produces pleasure, which is then 
attributed to the object itself. 
 The processing-fluency theory does a very good job at grappling with 
phenomena that previous theories have only captured in part. Since complexity, 
6 Because it gives rise to a phenomenal state, fluency can be gauged by subjective measures, e.g. 
subjects’ ratings of a task as easy or effortful; more often than not, however, it is gauged via 
objective measures of speed and accuracy, e.g. pronunciation latency (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993; 
Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990), naming latency (Reber et al., 1998), or likelihood of 
identification (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). The assumption here is that objective measures of fluency 
generally coincide with subjective feelings of fluency. For more on this topic, see Reber, Wurtz, & 
Zimmermann (2004). 
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novelty, and prototypicality all have an impact on processing fluency, it is easy to 
subsume these theories under the framework that Reber et al. have provided. Like 
Berlyne’s arousal-potential theory before it, the processing-fluency view nicely 
accommodates the fact that we often feel distaste for overly-complex stimuli: since 
extremely complex perceptual properties are by their nature difficult to process, 
Reber et al.’s model rightly predicts that they will not produce the feelings of 
fluency required for aesthetic pleasure. The processing fluency view also provides 
a more structural explanation of our preferences for e.g. familiarity, visual clarity, 
symmetry, and figure-ground contrast; these properties facilitate ease of 
processing, and so should predictably be preferred. The processing-fluency theory 
also goes a long way towards expanding upon the prototype-preference view 
insofar as it explains why prototypicality affects preference as it does. After all, it 
makes sense that central members of a category would be preferred by virtue of the 
fact that they are easier to process than members at the fringe (Winkielman, 
Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). Finally, the processing-fluency model 
provides us with explanations for other well-documented findings in cognitive 
psychology and experimental aesthetics. For instance, it offers a particularly strong 
account of why priming has a positive impact on judgments of liking, since priming 
makes subsequent processing more fluent and thus pleasurable (Winkielman and 
Fazendeiro, 2001). 
 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROCESSING-FLUENCY ACCOUNT 
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The fact that processing-fluency succeeds in providing a unifying framework for 
such a diverse array of research and observations suggests that it is on the right 
track. Indeed, it is the hallmark of any strong scientific theory that it explains and 
is supported by as many independent strands of data as possible. But, while the 
processing-fluency view of beauty accomplishes a lot, it is currently vulnerable to 
several serious criticisms. 
The first, and perhaps most often voiced, criticism against the processing-
fluency view is that it struggles to robustly explain why people tend to dislike 
stimuli that are extremely simple. If fluent processing and the positive affect it 
produces were sufficient to evoke judgments of beauty, we would expect 
exaggeratedly plain stimuli to be considered the most beautiful. But that is not 
generally so; the well-known U-shaped relationship between complexity and 
beauty still has to be dealt with. Reber et al. are aware of this explanatory weak-
spot and attempt to address it with Norbert Schwarz and Gerald Clore’s "feelings-
as-information" theory of affect (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The feelings-as-
information theory maintains that people utilize their affective states as sources of 
information when making evaluations, particularly when those feelings seem 
relevant: if the source of those feelings appears unrelated to what is being evaluated, 
said feelings are often discounted. In support of this hypothesis, Schwarz & Clore 
observed that on dreary days, subjects’ weather-driven negative moods often shift 
their quality-of-life evaluations downward, i.e. on rainy days people are more likely 
to report dissatisfaction with their lives because they misattribute their bad moods 
to the state of their lives and not the dreary weather. Strikingly, however, that 
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influence is eliminated when interviewers draw the subject’s attention to the true 
source of her melancholy by first inquiring about the weather. Citing this sort of 
finding, Reber et al. claim that the average person experiences distaste for 
extremely fluent, simple stimuli because the source of fluency/positive affect is 
discovered and then discounted. In other words, when simplicity makes it apparent 
that one’s pleasure is merely the result of e.g. high repetition or obvious figure-
ground contrast, we automatically discount that fluency and any pleasure it 
produces along with it. 
But does this strategy really make sense of the data? I think not. There are 
a number of serious problems with Reber et al.’s attempt to explain the low-
complexity/low-pleasure end of the U-shaped function between complexity and 
pleasure. First, there is no reason to think that the brute simplicity of a perceptual 
stimulus is enough to make perceivers more aware (either consciously or 
unconsciously) of the source of their affective states. Notice, for instance, that 
subjects often do not correct for misattribution of affect even in scenarios where the 
source of one’s irrelevant affect is glaringly obvious. Schnall et al., for instance, 
found that clearly disgusting environments—e.g. a room containing a transparent 
plastic cup with the dried-up remnants of a smoothie, a chewed pen, and a trashcan 
over-flowing with greasy pizza boxes and dirty-looking tissues—still had an 
unconscious impact on how participants judged unrelated moral vignettes; in these 
studies, subjects found otherwise neutral stories to be more morally vexing when 
appraised in repulsive conditions (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). As the 
previous study by Schwarz & Clore would indicate, is often not until subjects 
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actively control for these appraisals via top-down reflection that misattribution is 
stemmed. That is to say, one usually must explicitly focus on e.g. the gloominess 
of the day or the dirtiness of the room to discount any unrelated displeasure that 
those conditions evoke. Although subjects questioned in aesthetic preference 
studies are rarely explicitly asked to provide justifications for why they dislike 
simple stimuli, it seems unlikely that they actively mitigate their initial feelings of 
approval after realizing they were responding to the “wrong” perceptual properties.7  
Second, even if mere simplicity made us aware of the sources of our 
fluency-driven pleasure (e.g. repetition, familiarity, complexity, novelty, etc.), it is 
theoretically incoherent to suggest that our affective responses to those perceptual 
properties would be automatically discounted as irrelevant to the task of evaluating 
beauty or aesthetic preference. Here, the analogy to Schwarz & Clore’s inclement-
weather case seems to break down entirely. Our emotional responses to gloomy 
weather are quite clearly irrelevant to overall judgments of one’s quality of life and 
so reasonably will be dismissed on reflection.  But, whether an aesthetic object 
exhibits e.g. repetition, familiarity, complexity, novelty etc. seems entirely relevant 
to the evaluation of its beauty and aesthetic goodness. After all, the question of 
beauty and aesthetic pleasure is, in essence, a question about perceptual features, 
the combination thereof, and how they make us feel. If pleasure derived from the 
aforementioned aesthetic elements should be discounted as irrelevant to this 
7 Of course, I am not claiming that all discounting of irrelevant affect must be explicit: despite 
evidence of frequent misattribution of emotion, human beings are clearly capable of 
appropriately compartmentalizing their emotional appraisals. However, research into the 
misattribution of affect makes it clear that often such discounting does not arise without 
conscious reflection. 
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endeavor, then so too should form, shape, color, and every other perceptual 
property that can be processed either fluently or disfluently—but then, what is being 
judged as beautiful?  
Third, while the feelings-as-information theory of affect does predict that 
we will discount affective appraisals upon discovering that they come from an 
irrelevant source, that effect is significantly stronger in the case of irrelevant 
negative emotions. That is to say, we are more likely to explain away or dismiss 
unrelated bad feelings than good ones (Schwarz, 2010). In Schwarz & Clore’ 
inclement weather study, for instance, it was noted that the discounting effect was 
not obtained under sunny weather conditions. Even when subjects noted that the 
weather was enjoyable, they continued to evaluate their lives as better than average, 
suggesting that we are more inclined to dismiss sources of negative affect than 
positive. The problem is, if the fluent processing of perceptual stimuli is an 
intrinsically pleasurable experience, as Reber and his colleagues plausibly suggest, 
then overly simple stimuli would elicit positive appraisals that we would be much 
less likely to dismiss without significant incentive. 
 This is not the only empirical data point or observation that the processing-
fluency view struggles to elucidate. The second criticism that can be levied against 
Reber et al.’s stance also involves the aforementioned U-shaped function, though 
for reasons that are quite distinct from the last.  While it is important to explain our 
general preferences for perceptual properties that are e.g. neither too complex nor 
to simple, too familiar nor too novel, etc., it is also crucial to acknowledge the fact 
that these trends will apply “on the ground” in ways that are extremely flexible and 
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context-dependent. Unfortunately, reducing aesthetic pleasure only to the positive 
hedonic feedback of fluent processing makes that flexibility and context-sensitivity 
rather difficult to explain.  
Consider the finding that art experts and novices show very different ranges 
of distribution along our inverted U-shaped complexity-beauty curve. While 
individuals with minimal art experience tend to prefer objectively simpler 
perceptual stimuli, individuals with art training appear to gravitate towards more 
complex and asymmetric aesthetic elements (e.g., McWhinnie, 1968).8 To explain 
this fact, Reber et al. suggest that the art expert enjoys challenging stimuli because 
she has become skilled at effortlessly processing it; by seeking out repeat 
encounters with hard-to-process features, she learns to fluently process stimuli that 
are higher on the complexity scale and thus enjoys those stimuli more. At first 
glance, this explanation seems reasonable enough. After all, their view does predict 
that learning and competence will allow the expert to enjoy more complex 
perceptual features than the novice—and this is borne out by the data. On reflection, 
however, it becomes clear that this account is missing something crucial. For, notice 
that this explanation amounts to claiming by fiat that the art expert must only enjoy 
complex stimuli because it is as easy for her to process as it is for the novice to 
process simpler stimuli. While this might at times be the case, such a model does 
not make sense of the observation that people often report having a stronger sense 
of pleasure when processing inputs that initially challenge or continue to challenge 
8 Depending on one’s level of art education, the inverted U-shape is shifted up or down, so to 
speak. 
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them. If we got maximal pleasure from easy fluency, why would we welcome 
grappling with stimuli that are ambiguous, complex, or novel in the first place?  
Granted, Reber et al. are willing to concede that factors such as cognitive 
processing fluency may influence our ascriptions of beauty and sway our 
preferences, especially when it comes to the appraisal of artworks. Conceptual 
fluency reflects an individual’s sense of ease when carrying out higher-level 
processes involving stimulus meaning and its relation to other semantic knowledge 
structures (Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 2004). Reber contends that in instances 
of art appreciation, an individual may well experience conceptual fluency with 
respect to e.g. artistic intent, identification of a style or genre, engaging with 
dramatic content, etc., even in the absence of explicitly perceptual processing ease 
(Reber, 2012). While this might account for our willingness to tolerate effortful 
perceptual processing at times, it casts our motivations in an unnecessarily 
metacognitive light. Surely there are times when an individual struggles to process 
stimuli for the mere sake of having that perceptual stimuli “click” or “make sense;” 
why we do that is mysterious on Reber et al.’s view. 
More generally, the current processing-fluency theory seems to discount the 
impressive flexibility with which both art experts and laypeople alike are able to 
shift their appreciative stances to enjoy a broad range of complexity. As articulated, 
the view suggests that experts and novices are somewhat “locked in” to their 
patterns of aesthetic appreciation. If aesthetic pleasure and judgments of beauty 
correspond directly with optimally high levels of processing fluency (i.e. the point 
at which processing is as fluent as possible without being so obvious as to trigger 
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discounting) then Reber et al.’s model should also predict that individuals 
consistently prefer aesthetic objects that provide the same range of fluency 
processing. The problem is, common experience tells us that this prediction is 
unlikely to be confirmed.  If affordance of fluent processing were the sole predictor 
of preference, then one individual art-lover with established processing capacities 
would not feel equally strong aesthetic pleasure in the presence of e.g. an intricate 
hybrid tea rose and a sleek arum lily. And yet, it seems quite possible for a single 
person to do just that. Indeed, the fact that people are capable of flexibly 
appreciating a wide range of perceptual stimuli with varying degrees of fluency 
affordance is a delightful and important-to-capture feature of aesthetic experience. 
 
IV. DISFLUENCY, NEGATIVE AFFECT, & INTEREST 
In light of these objections, it should be clear that the processing-fluency view has 
some significant inadequacies. As we have seen, the theory (i) does not currently 
deliver a robust explanation for why simple, very fluently processed stimuli are 
frequently unappreciated by the average observer; it also (ii) ignores the highly 
flexible and context-sensitive manner in which individuals can actively shift 
themselves into an appreciative aesthetic stance. I believe, however, that these 
explanatory gaps exist not because the processing-fluency view is wrong, but 
because Reber et al. fail to consider the crucial roles of disfluent processing, 
negative affect, and interest in aesthetic experience. They are missing the other half 
of the puzzle, so to speak. In his original arousal-potential theory, Berlyne astutely 
noted that our engagement with aesthetic objects entails an intricate interaction 
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between interest on the one hand and pleasingness on the other (in adapting his 
schema to the processing-fluency view, pleasingness can easily be understood as 
perceptual-fluency). So, what might we make of the interplay between interest and 
fluent perceptual processing? How might this new construct allow us to explain 
what Reber et al.’s view does not? 
To answer this question, we should briefly consider the affective, 
motivational, and cognitive structure of interest. At the time of Berlyne’s writing, 
virtually no one was writing on interest; since then, many researchers and theorists 
have contributed to a growing body of literature on that topic. While there is 
controversy today over how, exactly, we should think of psychological interest (for 
a review, see Silva, 2006), it is remarkable to note that many basic tenets of 
Berlyne’s view are still largely corroborated by contemporary characterizations. 
The operating principle of Berlyne’s view is that many organisms are motivated by 
what he called the reduction of uncertainty. In his arousal-potential theory, he 
argued that as the “uncertainty” or complexity of stimuli in an environment 
increases, an organism will enter into an aroused affective state that manifests itself 
as an exploratory impulse—e.g. it triggers behaviors such as foraging, tasting, 
seeking, smelling, uncovering, etc. In short, the animal becomes interested in 
attending to whatever stimuli is being perceived as novel or “uncertain.” After 
engaging with the perturbingly “uncertain” stimuli for a while, the organism will 
be motivated to reduce that e.g. uncertainty, novelty, complexity, etc. into more 
easily processed, positively-appraised patterns.  
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In cognitive psychology, it is now a common assumption that most 
organisms have evolved basic exploratory states such as, e.g. “interest” (Izard, 
1977; Tomkins, 1984), “seeking” (Panksepp; 1998), and “curiosity” (Gruber et al., 
2014; Blanchard et al., 2015; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). And there is good reason to 
believe that these basic states are intrinsically motivating not only for humans, but 
across the animal kingdom. Macaque monkeys, for instance, show a clear 
preference for receiving information even when it has no impact on their reward 
rates; in fact, some primates even show a willingness to forgo a portion of their 
reward just to receive advance information about whether or not it will be delivered 
(Blanchard et al., 2015; Blanchard & Bromberg-Martin, 2015). Strikingly similar 
results have been found in research on pigeons, which reliably elect to receive less 
food when the choice is accompanied by information about the timing of that 
feeding—they prefer these “informative” feeding options even when the content of 
that information is negatively appraised, e.g. when they learn that their feeding will 
be postponed for longer than usual (Fortes, Vasconcelos, & Machado 2016). 
Presumably, if an animal is willing to sacrifice prized items such as food or water 
for the purpose of merely gathering new information of interest, then the process of 
resolving uncertainty is itself intrinsically rewarding, or hedonically marked. 
Notice that this initial observation already gives us one possible avenue 
through which to explain what Reber et al. cannot with respect to the average 
perceiver’s distaste for extremely simple stimuli. If hedonic feedback produced by 
highly fluent processing were the sole source of affect driving our judgments of 
beauty, then we might indeed find exaggeratedly simple stimuli to be the most 
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beautiful or preferable. In line with the feelings-as-information view, however, I 
want to argue that the level of interest that a stimulus evokes also serves as an 
important cue to the observer about an object’s pleasantness. In short, feelings of 
interest and processing fluency both influence our affective states and subsequent 
aesthetic experiences. It seems reasonable to posit that while high perceptual 
fluency may well be hedonically marked, the strength of the positive affect that it 
produces and the intensity of that appraisal seem to rely on how interesting and 
attention-grabbing we find the object in question. After all, when things are going 
well, one’s perceptual system is constantly inundated with perfectly benign and 
perfectly fluent processing: we perceive a never-ending procession of fluent stimuli 
e.g. familiar people, cars, trees, lampposts, etc. yet, we do not walk around in a 
constant stupor over the aesthetic grandeur of it all. Rather, it isn’t until we 
encounter perceptual stimuli of particular interest that that fluency seems to give 
rise to genuine aesthetic pleasure. In the case of, say, a simple outline of a circle (or 
any other austere stimulus), interest has virtually nothing to cling to.   
If being the target of one’s interest has so great an impact on the intensity 
and quality of our aesthetic judgments, we would do well to interrogate how stimuli 
come to hold our interest in the first place. One plausible answer to this question 
comes from Alison Gopnik’s work on the role of negative and positive affect in 
human theory-formation and explanation (1998). On her view, affective 
phenomenology motivates our efforts to form theories about the world and marks 
the successful creation of “coherent” representational structures. As Gopnik 
describes it, theory-building is motivated by “hmm” moments (negative feelings of 
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anxiety, frustration, agitation, etc.) that arise when a system lacks relevant e.g. 
causal, spatial, conceptual, etc. representations; “aha” moments, by contrast, are 
marked by the positive feelings we get when “consistently” or “coherently” mapped 
representations are established. To cash this out in terms that will be relevant here, 
Gopnik’s view highlights the fact that an initial experience of disfluency (and the 
negative affect that it brings) is often required to get interest and motivation off the 
ground. Put simply, without the “hmm” moment, there can be no “aha!”9  
 Some empirically-based research in cognitive psychology seems to confirm 
the intuition that perceptual disfluency and resulting negative affect motivate and 
sustain interest. Brief episodes of negative affect associated with high-arousal 
emotions like confusion and frustration, for instance, appear to have an overall 
positive effect on problem-solving (D’Mello et al, 2009). It has also been found 
that participants who are primed with negative emotions not only experience 
enhanced motivation to finish challenging tasks (Liew & Tan, 2016), they also 
become more focused on seeking and using novel sources of information when 
solving problems (Spering et al, 2005).  
The fact that processing disfluency and negative affect bear directly on our 
states of interest once again goes a long way towards explaining what Reber et al.’s 
view does not. One of the weak points of the original processing-fluency view is its 
9 To be clear, it is worth adding at this juncture that a third, prior appraisal likely stands as a 
necessary condition for interest to take root in the first place. In order for e.g. disfluency, 
uncertainty, complexity, and so on to motivate information-seeking, a subject must first care about 
or potentially value the source of that disfluency. The Macaque monkey, for instance, might be 
compelled to sacrifice rewards to clear up uncertainty about its next meal, but only because it 
values food. It would likely not give up rewards to complete its representational map of, say, where 
its human handler goes after work. It is because we care about things that disfluency matters and 
the displeasure of that disfluency becomes motivating. 
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inability to explain how we can experience aesthetic pleasure when engaging with 
stimuli that are subjectively disfluent or perceptually challenging. On an interest-
fluency view such as the one I am advocating here, however, we would fully expect 
individuals to feel intrinsically motivated by the presence of especially effortful 
processing. In a manner of speaking, it is that disfluency and subsequent negative 
affect which signal to the viewer that there are worthwhile problems to be solved 
or ambiguity to be resolved. In fact, a recent study from Leknes and her colleagues 
might help us explain why the feelings of pleasure we experience upon resolving 
e.g. perceptual uncertainty are even more gratifying than many straightforward 
cases of fluent processing. While fluently processing stimuli may produce positive 
affect, Leknes et al.’ study shows that subjective experiences of negative and 
positive affect can be pushed to the extreme by a contrast effect, i.e. fluency should 
be all the more pleasant when following a period of contrastive disfluency (Leknes, 
2013). 
Recently, theorists have turned their attention to the notion that exploration-
motivating states such as interest are a kind of sui generis mental attitude of 
questioning (Carruthers, 2018.; Friedman, 2013).  On such views, questioning 
attitudes are characterized as affective states that motivate one not just to seek 
information, but to seek information amending a specific state of ignorance, e.g. 
ignorance about where I am, what that is, when something will happen, etc. 
Importantly, these questioning attitudes do not need to be consciously articulated 
nor metacognitive to guide our behavior; presumably, much of the seeking and 
exploratory behavior we see across species is driven by questioning attitudes whose 
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content concerns the mere acquisition of propositional knowledge, e.g. what an 
object is, where it is, etc.10 As this affectively-driven questioning attitude combines 
with more sophisticated reasoning capacities, we approach the kind of 
propositionally complex information processing that gives rise to conscious  
questioning and explaining in humans.  
Given this understanding of primitive questioning attitudes, it would appear 
that a subject’s level of interest in a stimulus not only has an impact on the strength 
of our aesthetic judgments, it also helps to focus our perceptual processes on 
various aspects of the stimulus that evokes our interest. It is through this ability to 
frame our aesthetic projects and focus our attention on different elements of a 
perceptual experience that we are able to appreciate a wide variety of stimuli 
regardless of the perceptual fluency that it affords. Indeed, one of the contributions 
that literacy in art theory makes to the aesthetic process is that it gives us a wider 
range of questions—both explicit and implicit—from which to draw. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the processing-fluency view correctly focuses on hedonically marked, 
effortless processing as an important source of aesthetic pleasure, focusing only on 
fluent processing draws our attention away from an equally crucial aspect of 
aesthetic appreciation. As I have endeavored to show here, perceptual disfluency 
10 That said, a remarkable number of animal species (e.g. brown rats, crows, ravens, 
chimpanzees, etc.) do exhibit reasoning capacities and behaviors that are reflective of more 
robust understanding (Sawa, 2009). These animals are motivated to seek out information not 
only about what is in the world, but—at least to a limited extent—how and why things operate 
as they do.   
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and the negative affect that it produces also have a noteworthy role to play in our 
judgments of beauty. By piquing our interest, disfluency and negative affect have 
the power to motivate aesthetic engagement, amplify the pleasure we feel when 
resolving disfluency, and sustain the questioning attitudes that often make 
processing stimuli desirable in the first place. With this more elaborate 
understanding of the interaction between positively and negatively marked 
affective appraisals in place, the processing fluency view is in a much better 
position to stand up against criticism.  Specifically, the view can now provide a 
more rigorous explanation of the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
complexity and aesthetic preference, and it can account for the immense variability 
of aesthetic judgements that individuals make on a daily basis. There is, of course, 
more work to be done to develop and test this view, but for now it should be clear 







UPDATING THOUGHT THEORY: 
EMOTION AND THE NON-PARADOX OF FICTION 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The so-called “paradox of fiction” has been churning up controversy in philosophy 
of art for well over forty years now. The paradox, as originally stated by Colin 
Radford, is built upon three prima facie plausible premises (Radford, 1975). The 
first premise is that (1) genuine and rational emotions require accompanying 
‘existence beliefs’—beliefs about the world and how that world might affect us. So, 
the story goes, when I see a bear in the woods at dusk, I am really and rationally 
afraid because I believe that I am actually in danger, e.g. I believe that the bear 
might eat me! The trouble is, if rational emotional states can only be predicated on 
beliefs about what exists, then our apparently emotional reactions to works of 
fiction look rather paradoxical. After all, when we imaginatively engage with 
fictions, (2) we do not believe those fictional characters or events to be real: at every 
turn we demonstrate through both action and conscious avowal that they are works 
of fiction. And yet, it also seems clear to most that (3) fictions do make us feel 
something like real and rational emotions. To borrow just a few popular examples 
from the debate, we cringe as Othello stalks towards Desdemona on the stage, we 
weep over the tortured fate of Anna Karenina, and gruesome monsters on the silver 
screen make us tremble in our seats.  So, what are we to make of all of that cringing, 
weeping, and trembling?1 
1 Put formally, the paradox of fiction is generally expressed as follows: 
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Radford himself eventually concluded that our emotional reactions to 
fiction are altogether irrational, a claim that has proven less than satisfying to many 
theorists.  At some point in time, each of Radford’s three premises has come under 
strategic attack, leading philosophers to a number of surprising and often equally 
polemic conclusions. Kendall Walton’s Pretend Theory, for instance, famously 
contends that since beliefs are a necessary component of genuine emotion, fictive 
scenarios can only evoke ‘pretend’ or quasi-emotional states—such reactions may 
be rational, but they are not real emotions (Walton,1978). Taking a different 
approach, proponents of Illusion Theory such as Alan Paskow propose that our 
responses to works of fiction are unproblematic because we do to some extent form 
what he calls ‘illusory beliefs’ about fictional events and characters (Paskow, 
2004). And in opposition to these views, Thought Theorists such as Peter Lamarque 
and Noël Carroll attempt to reject the idea that emotions require anything like belief 
states about the world. On their account, we need only to represent (Lamarque, 
1981) or ‘entertain the thought of” (Carroll, 1990) evocative scenarios to 
experience genuine emotion, no existence-beliefs required. 
At first glance, it would look as though every possible solution to the 
paradox has been explored. And yet, despite all of the careful and clever debate 
surrounding this topic, no single strategy has definitively put the puzzle to rest. One 
reason for this ongoing controversy, I propose, is that the aforementioned strategies 
are driven (at least in part) by intuition and fiat. It is standard practice for scholars 
(1) To experience e.g. fear, one must believe that one is e.g., in real danger. 
(2) When one knowingly engages with fiction, one does not believe that one is e.g., in real 
danger. 
(3) When one engages with fiction, one experiences e.g. fear. 
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to endorse one or more of these premises as ‘obvious,’ and imprecise terminology 
in the literature abounds.  Examples of this hand-waving are evident in all three of 
the well-known strategies aimed at resolving the paradox of fiction. Walton, for 
instance, deems the first premise (1) of the paradox to be ‘common sense,’ Paskow 
provides an extremely loose and contentious definition of ‘belief’ in his disavowal 
of premise (2), and Thought Theorists start from the third premise (3) by asserting 
that genuine emotional reactions to fiction simply are a commonplace occurrence. 
Because disagreement over the paradox of fiction can easily be chalked up to these 
differences in prior assumptions, the present-day debate is at something of an 
impasse.  
What could break this standstill? Surprisingly, although the paradox of 
fiction was inspired by early cognitivist work on the ontology and structure of 
emotions, very little attention has been paid to contemporary scientific advances in 
that very domain. Since this puzzle first grabbed our attention in the early 1980’s, 
theories of emotion in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience 
have changed dramatically. In that time, we have explored the neurological 
underpinnings of affect, discovered much about its expansive role in everyday 
cognition, developed new models of emotional processing, and theorized about its 
evolutionary function. These advances have a great deal to contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between emotion, belief, and fiction—yet, they 
are rarely utilized to evaluate theorists’ treatments of Radford’s paradox.  
In what follows, I aim to support and further develop Lamarque and 
Carroll’s Thought Theory along empirical lines. This project is valuable for two 
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reasons.  First, it is reasonable (as a criterion of endorsement) to want our best 
philosophical theories of emotion and art to align with current models of affect 
across the disciplines. I intend to show that only Thought Theory—with its rejection 
of the premise that emotions are predicated on existence-beliefs—can align in this 
way. Second, as I will explain, while few formal attacks have been levied directly 
against Thought Theory, its current lack of empirical support ultimately leaves the 
view open to doubt. By elaborating on Thought Theory with an appeal to recent 
findings on the cognitive structure and function of affect, I hope to more 
definitively resolve the paradox of fiction in favor of Lamarque and Carroll’s view.  
In section II, I will briefly review some of the thought-experiments and 
arguments often used to support the notion that (1) “existence beliefs” are a 
necessary component of emotion. Of particular interest will be the work of 
cognitivist philosophers Radford and Walton who, upon embracing this first 
premise, problematically conclude that our reactions to fiction are either not 
instances of real emotion or are real but practically and theoretically irrational, 
respectively. From there, I will attempt to fortify Thought Theorists’ rebuttals to 
such lines of thinking. In section III, I will explore a generalized empirical account 
of emotion, focusing on the role of emotion in mind-wandering, counterfactual 
thinking, and prospection. As I will argue, the fact that we routinely recruit the 
affective system to engage in these instances of hypothetical thinking shows that 
we are quite capable of having real emotional responses to scenarios that we do not 
believe to be true. With the genuine status of emotional reactions to fiction 
safeguarded, in section IV I will argue contra Radford that these responses appear 
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both practically and theoretically rational (in the way that is appropriate to emotion 
rather than belief) in light of the evolutionary function of the affective system. 
 
II. ‘EXISTENCE BELIEFS’ AND QUASI OR IRRATIONAL EMOTIONS 
The paradox of fiction starts with the premise that emotional states are predicated 
on ‘existence-beliefs’ about the world. That is, it claims that for a scenario to really 
and truly sway us emotionally, we must believe that scenario to be real. This idea 
has been endorsed by a number of philosophers of art over the years, and its 
popularity has had a profound impact on the strategies devised for solving 
Radford’s paradox. But, why think that existence beliefs are a necessary component 
of real or rational emotions in the first place?  
The existence-belief criterion built into premise (1) owes its beginnings to 
early cognitivist theories of emotion. Around the time that Radford first published 
his now famous puzzle, cognitivist philosophers such as Robert Solomon began to 
explicitly emphasize the idea that emotions require propositional content (Solomon, 
1988). That is to say, when we are e.g. afraid, that fear is informed by judgments 
of context and aimed at intentional objects—the fear is about something. In the case 
of our chance encounter with a bear, Solomon would maintain that while 
physiology may contribute to the richness of my emotion, it is fundamentally the 
belief or judgment that I am in danger that constitutes fear itself. This kind of 
cognitivist theory has some intuitive pull.  As others have pointed out, there seems 
to be a clear causal relationship between our propositional attitudes and our 
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emotional states.2  If, for instance, a last beam of light were to pierce the dusk and 
reveal our terrifying bear to be nothing more than an imposing statue, quite a 
different emotional picture would unfold. Given this new information, my belief 
would change (I would no longer judge that I am in danger) and my emotional state 
would presumably change along with it (perhaps to one of relief or amusement at 
my own readiness to flee).  
Advocates of cognitivism have used these cases to posit that emotions 
should be identified strictly with the contents of one’s beliefs; if no relevant belief 
or judgment is held, then no real emotion is instantiated.3 As I will discuss in later 
sections, such a purely cognitivist model of emotion is no longer widely endorsed 
by scholars of affect. At the height of its popularity, however, this model inspired 
a number of well-known attempts at resolving the paradox of fiction. Presumably, 
it is with these cognitivist claims in mind that Walton proclaims, ‘it seems a 
principle of common sense…that fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a 
belief that one is in danger’ (1978, p. 7). Radford similarly reiterates the postulate 
while defending his original statement of the paradox, claiming that ‘I cannot be 
agitated or concerned for my safety, or the safety of others, by something I do not 
believe to be a possible danger to myself or others’ (1977, p. 210).  
So, what are the repercussions of granting this strong—albeit flawed—
initial premise? In articulating his Pretend Theory, Walton eventually concludes 
2 Most notably, see Jerome Neu (2000) and Martha Nussbaum (2001). 
3 This should not be confused with the claim that all affective states require propositional content. 
Even on a strong cognitivist view, one could experience a change in affect qua e.g. moods or states 
of pain/pleasure without forming propositional beliefs. The existence-belief criterion is proposed 
specifically for the elicitation of emotions. 
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that knowingly engaging with fictions can at most elicit quasi-emotions, or mental 
states that are not the same as our emotional reactions to the real world. Crucial to 
his argument is the idea that genuine emotional states and their constitutive beliefs 
must reliably issue in action. So, Walton argues, when a moviegoer named Charles 
trembles at the appearance of ‘the Green Slime Monster’ on a movie screen, we 
know that a) Charles does not really believe he is in danger and hence b) Charles 
is not really afraid, because he does nothing to protect himself.  As Walton astutely 
observes, audience members like Charles rarely do anything: he does not try to 
vanquish the monster on the screen, he does not run for his life, and he does not 
selflessly attempt to protect the children seated next to him. Although Charles may 
exhibit a few of the telltale physiological makers of emotion, such as trembling, his 
trembling is not accompanied by all of the other behavioral markers of ‘true’ fear 
because he lacks the requisite belief states.  Walton’s strong cognitivist leanings 
compel him to conclude that Charles is merely in a state of ‘pretend’ or quasi-fear; 
and since Charles is merely playing at emoting and is not in the grips of genuine, 
belief-based fear, Charles’ response to the terrible monster looks more than 
anything like a rational game of make-believe. 
While Radford is willing to grant that our responses to fiction are instances 
of real emotion (e.g. fear), he endorses cognitivism to claim that existence-beliefs 
are at least a requirement for rational emotions. Recalling our working example, 
imagine that I continue to carry on as if my life were in peril even after I realize 
that I am merely in the presence of a bear statue. According to Radford, being afraid 
of the statue when I know it can do me no harm is analogous to feeling afraid for 
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fictional characters: I know that there is no real danger, and so to emote as if there 
were an actual threat is to be irrational (1982). Radford does not elaborate on the 
sense in which emotional responses to works of fiction are ‘irrational,’ but as 
Richard Joyce has insightfully remarked, Radford’s charge likely arises “from the 
dictates of two distinct normative frameworks” (2000, p. 216). On the one hand, 
Radford seems to take issue with our emotional responses to fiction because they 
are not instrumentally rational, i.e., if the function of fear is to e.g. promote safety, 
then being afraid while believing myself to be safe is of no practical use. On the 
other hand, Radford also seems to object that emotional reactions to fiction defy 
theoretical rationality; that is, he thinks that emotions not built on existence-beliefs 
are plainly ill-founded, i.e. they are not supported by the proper evidence. As 
Radford himself puts it, ‘if I am frightened by a horror movie…it is not only helpful 
but correct to say to myself “Don't be silly!”…there is nothing to be frightened of.’ 
So, even if we could benefit practically from engaging with fictions, emotional 
reactions to fictive entities would still look theoretically problematic or ‘incoherent’ 
on Radford’s account (1982). 
III. THOUGHT THEORY & REAL EMOTIONS
Many theorists have objected to the idea that our emotional reactions to fiction are 
different from the emotional states we experience when dealing with the real world. 
One of the most promising lines of attack against Walton’s claim was developed 
by Lamarque in his account of Thought Theory. The Thought Theorist’s strategy 
for dealing with paradox of fiction has generally been to flip the puzzle on its head: 
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the real or genuine status of our emotional reactions to fiction is granted as 
introspectively self-evident, and the task then becomes to explain the how these 
emotions are possible (Lamarque, 294). The explanation, for Lamarque, is that 
while fear in the real world is often inspired and directed by beliefs, there is no 
principled reason to think that all emotions are predicated on such existence-beliefs. 
He suggests, instead, that when we engage with works of fiction, we are able to 
respond emotionally not because we believe in the existence of e.g. Desdemona or 
the Green Slime Monster, but because we token thoughts or mental representations 
of those entities and the fictional worlds they inhabit.   
The key point of Lamarque’s theory is that thought-contents or 
representations provide us with mental descriptions (often in the form of 
propositional content) that do not get judged automatically as veridical or not.  
Take, for example, the thought-content the bear is going to eat me!  Lamarque 
seems to suggest that when we entertain this thought—while safe, far from the 
woods at dusk—the content itself need not strictly involve judgments of truth-
value. In other words, I can think about a predatory bear with a voracious appetite, 
but those thoughts do not necessarily become the target of my beliefs about what is 
true or plausible. I can think about such things while remaining doxastically 
unmoved in one direction or another. Of course, if I am faced with an actual bear, 
this thought-content can and often does immediately become the propositional 
content of a truth judgment, e.g. the bear is (really) going to eat me! Importantly, 
however, this belief-state is a further psychological attitude that one can hold in 
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relation to the thought being entertained, it is not necessarily part of the thought 
itself.  
With this distinction between representation and belief in place, Lamarque 
argues that the actual trigger of any emotion is the content of one’s thoughts. When 
the Green Slime Monster turns towards Charles and creeps forward on the movie 
screen, Charles responds emotionally to the thought-content the monster is going 
to get me! without forming any existence-beliefs about the slime or its actual ability 
to harm him. Far from paradoxically being frightened by things that are not really 
there to harm him, Charles is scared by the cognitive event tokened in the act of 
representing the Green Slime Monster; in this case, the thought of an approaching 
threat evokes his fear4. Lamarque goes on to clarify that Charles is not afraid of his 
thoughts—he is not terrified at the prospect of thinking things (at least, not under 
usual circumstances). What Charles is afraid of at a conscious level and in actuality 
is the intentional object of his fear, the Green Slime Monster, which need not be 
real or judged as real. According to Lamarque, this fear arises in the same way that 
any other real-world emotion would, hence it is genuine.  
Such is the Thought Theorist’s approach to defending the real status of our 
emotions when partaking in works of fiction, and it is promising one. If we do not 
need to believe we are e.g. in danger to experience genuine fear, then the paradox 
dissolves. As it stands, however, a number of weak points in the theory leave it 
open to objections by Walton and anyone sympathetic to his cognitivist views. On 
4 As I will emphasize in the next section, the precise causal role that these representations might 
play in eliciting emotion likely varies from scenario to scenario. At this juncture, however, we 
need only note the general shape of Lamarque’s view for later elaboration. 
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what theoretical basis, for instance, can the Thought Theorists claim that our 
emotional reactions to fiction are the same as those we have when dealing with real-
world scenarios? Lamarque has certainly provided a model for how psychological 
attitudes may be attached to ‘thoughts’ independently of one another in principle. 
The mere conceptual possibility of emotion without existence-beliefs does not, 
however, settle the question of whether emotions are in fact elicited in the absence 
of belief. Unless emotions reduce to mere phenomenology—and as I will explain 
below, there is good reason to think that they do not—then the observation that we 
‘feel’ emotional when thinking about both real bears and fictional monsters does 
not settle the matter. To resolve this question, we would need to give an account of 
what emotion is and look to see if it is instantiated in a way that is consistent with 
Lamarque’s model. Without this step, Thought Theorists can do little to persuade 
anyone not already inclined to intuitively agree.  
So, what is an emotion? At first glance, this question might strike readers 
as overly ambitious. The nature of emotion has inspired countless philosophical 
and scientific investigations; models of emotion differ significantly in their 
characterizations, and at present, no single view has acquired consensus. What we 
might call “categorical” theories of affect (e.g. Ekman, 1992; Panskepp 1998), for 
instance, place emphasis on the notion that we have innate, discrete operating 
systems for each ‘basic’ emotion. By contrast, so-called ‘dimensional’ models (e.g. 
Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Barrett & Wager, 2006) suggest that all 
affective states are instantiated via the same neurophysiological systems, but differ 
from each other along dimensions such as e.g. valence and arousal, and are 
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thereafter socially constructed and internalized.5 Still others maintain that we have 
some “affect program emotions” that function like natural kinds, while others are 
higher-order and socially constructed (Griffiths, 1997). I certainly do not presume 
to resolve the conflict between these views here, and fortunately I do not need to. 
Despite their many differences, these and other competing theories converge upon 
a number of important points; any conclusions about fiction and emotion that we 
might come to by appealing to those commonalities should be on firm ground, 
regardless of whether emotions are natural kinds or not. 
One general insight granted by most contemporary theorists is that emotion 
involves (i) physiological, (ii) evaluative, (iii) motivational, and (iv) 
phenomenological components. Although the extent to which these components are 
necessary or sufficient for emotion is highly contended, few would deny that each 
has a role to play. Revisiting our terrifying bear-encounter, cases of e.g. fear seem 
to involve a number of changes at both the physical and psychological level. As the 
bear rears up menacingly on its hind legs, for instance, (i) my heart-rate climbs and 
my breath quickens; (ii) I appraise the bear as potentially bad or threatening; (iii) I 
suddenly feel a strong inclination to run, and experience an acute focusing of 
attention on the bear and any possible escape-routes; and (iv) many of these bodily 
and mental states may be introspectively accessible, i.e. I feel that I am afraid.  
Such changes are, of course, driven by different cognitive mechanisms. 
Many of these (i) physiological and (iii) motivational shifts are the product of a 
heightened state of arousal, and are roughly controlled by the reticular activating 
5 For more on the debate between categorical and dimensional models of affect, see e.g. Zachar & 
Ellis (2012). 
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system in the brainstem (involved in sleep and attentiveness regulation), the 
autonomic nervous system (responsible for changes in involuntary motor functions) 
and the endocrine system (the release of e.g. adrenaline) (Pfaff, 2015). But, 
emotions also have a crucial (ii) evaluative component. When we experience any 
given emotion, that emotion will be valenced to some extent or another, i.e. it will 
carry with it either positive representations of “seeming-goodness” or negative 
representations of “seeming-badness.” While changes in emotional arousal may at 
times be automatic, is clear that (i) physiological and (iii) motivational states often 
interact robustly with these (ii) valenced appraisals.  After all, it is presumably the 
fact that I tag ‘the bear might eat me!’ with bad-seeming valence that activates my 
heightened state of arousal and subsequent flight-or-fight response.6  
While there is solid evidence that unique mechanisms exist for the 
processing of pleasant and unpleasant stimuli (Viinikainen et al., 2010), valence in 
general is encoded within a number of limbic areas, including the anterior insula, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex (Rainville et al., 
1997; Peyron et al., 2000; Levy & Glimcher, 2012). These regions are consistently 
activated across a diverse range of affective states (Phan et al., 2002), and localized 
brain trauma or impairment appears to have a devastating impact on emotional 
processing (Damasio, 1994). Together, these systems contribute to the (iv) 
experiential quality of our fears, joys, and everything in between.  
It is worth noting in this general characterization that emotion is just one of 
many affective states: what makes emotion different from, say, a mood, or pain and 
6 Were a world-renowned bear-trainer to find herself in the same scenario, the valence of her 
appraisal would likely differ, and her emotional experience would be quite unlike mine. 
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pleasure? Emotion appears to be unique in the sense that it is about something. As 
the cognitivists remarked long ago, emotions such as fear take specific targets. 
When changes to arousal and valence are attributed to a particular target or 
occurrence, we are said to be experiencing an emotion. I am afraid of the bear, 
angry at myself for going into the woods at dusk, and relieved by the fact that it was 
only a statue.7 Notice, though, that the target and cause of one’s emotional state 
need not be one and the same. Extensive research on the fungibility of affect has 
found that negative valence can often be caused by unpleasant stimuli and then 
attributed to an unrelated target. Reading moral vignettes while in a dirty room, for 
instance, has been shown to intensify feelings of moral outrage and anger. While 
the target of that anger is the moral vignettes (the characters therein are bad-
seeming), the cause of that anger is presumably misattributed negative-valence—
valence that is caused by appraising unpleasant conditions (Schnall et al, 2008; Li 
et al, 2007).8 
In sum, the empirical literature gives us good reason to hold that emotions 
are comprised of changes in arousal and/or valence at the level of (i) physiology, 
(ii) evaluation, (iii) motivation, and (iv) phenomenology, which are then attributed 
7 It is interesting to note that when the object of one’s altered arousal and valence is specifically a 
bodily sensation (say, the pinch of a needle), it is often classed as pain or pleasure. Changes to 
these networks accompanied by no specific target at all begin to look more like moods, e.g. when 
the emotion targets nothing in particular, the high arousal and negative valence of fear becomes a 
mood of anxiety.  
8 Assuming that we do in fact respond to fiction with genuine emotion, it is important to point out 
that when we e.g. watch Othello on the stage, the emotions that arise in us may be caused by a 
multitude of things.  One could, for instance, feel sad because the drama reminds her of real 
suffering and real pain in the world. Or, one might have a general mood of anxiety that is given 
expression through the fiction. But, notice that such responses do not fall under the purview of the 
paradox of fiction: if an actor’s fictional predicament triggers sadness, but the target and cause of 
that sadness is real suffering or one’s own state, then that emotional response is predicated on an 
existence belief and it is no longer puzzling on a cognitivist reading.  
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to a target9. With this barebones account in place, it should be a relatively 
straightforward task to justify the Thought Theorist’s foundational assumption that 
emotional reactions to fiction are real. To substantiate this premise, we would need 
to show that engaging with fiction and nonfiction elicits the same kind of output (i-
iv), is driven by the same neurological mechanisms (the affective brain-networks 
described above), and is the result of processing the same kinds of cognitive 
content.  
The first of these steps is clear enough—as Theory Theorists note, few 
would deny that we (iv) introspectively feel like we have emotional reactions to 
fiction. When prompted, most will avow that they are worried about Desdemona, 
saddened by Anna Karenina, and afraid of the Green Slime Monster. And it is also 
certainly the case that our reactions to fiction can have profound (ii) physiological 
impacts: just remember all of that crying, weeping, and trembling! Although it is 
true (as Walton noted) that our reactions to fiction and non-fiction may produce 
distinct outward behavioral patterns, that behavioral difference does not reveal a 
(iii) motivational one. In fact, the Thought Theorists may happily concede Walton’s 
point that beliefs strongly impact our actions, but deny that overt action is 
constitutive of our emotions.  On this reading, when Charles is in the movie theater, 
his emotional response (i-iv) includes motivation to e.g. run away, hide, etc., but 
his actions are also controlled and down-regulated by the belief that he is not really 
9 Though I will not pursue the topic at length here, I do not assume that emotional attribution 
needs to be conscious.  One could, I believe, experience heightened arousal/negative valence and 
represent a target as bad-seeming without direct awareness of the target’s newly acquired status.  
Representations of the target as bad-seeming could have behavioral repercussions (e.g. frowning 
when the target is in view) in the absence of any conscious awareness, hence the thought “I was 
angry at him but didn’t even know it.”   
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in danger. This does not, however, mean that the motivational states associated with 
fear were not activated10.  
Whether or not our reactions to fiction include (ii) valenced appraisal is an 
empirical question—one that lines up in general with the question of whether our 
emotional responses to fiction rely on the same general cognitive mechanisms as 
those that produce our emotions to everyday events. Fortunately, a number of 
studies have been conducted to explore the relationship between fiction and the 
affective arousal-valence network. In 2008, for instance, Jabbi et al. scanned 
subjects at varying points while they imagined disgusting gustatory experiences, 
tasted an unpleasant liquid, and viewed actors pretending to do the same. They 
found that under all of these conditions subjects displayed clear neurological 
markers of disgust. Specifically, brain scans showed increased activity in the 
anterior insula (a region strongly linked to representations of negative valence) 
whether participants were imagining the foul liquid or actually tasting it 
themselves.  Similarly, in 2010 Bray et al. found that receiving real and imagined 
rewards both engage overlapping areas of the orbitofrontal cortex, the primary 
neurological network associated with valence. And in 2011, Wallentin et al. 
confirmed that listening to intense fictions leads to an increase in heart rate along 
with increased activation of the amygdala and other brain regions associated with 
emotional arousal.  
These empirical studies, and others like them, go a long way towards 
showing that imaginative engagement with fiction produces genuine emotions.  
10 For more on the interaction between belief and emotion, see next section. 
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Reactions to the imagined Green Slime Monster and the real bear are churned out 
by the same cognitive processes and produce the same sort of phenomenology and 
targeting of objects. In one case, we know the target of our emotions to be imagined 
and in the other case we believe the target to be real. But should that matter?  Why 
should we think, as Walton contends, that emotions require input in the form of 
existence-beliefs to count as genuine emotion? 
Certainly, if we take our encounter with a bear in the woods at dusk to be 
the only archetype of true emotion, then Walton’s objection poses a serious 
concern. As the cognitivists made clear long ago, existence-beliefs do factor 
strongly into our fearful attempts to flee real-life danger.  Over the past several 
decades, however, it has become apparent that our emotional architecture is 
involved in responding to much more than just our perceived environments.11 We 
now understand that the brain networks associated with affect play an extensive 
role in everyday modes of cognition that arguably do not require anything like 
belief-states as input. It has recently been shown, for instance that affect is crucial 
for “prospection” (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007), or our ability to weigh options and 
make decisions about future states that are as yet uncertain or counterfactual. When 
Benoit et al (2014) investigated brain activation during guided acts of prospection, 
they found that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (associated with affective 
processing) was active when subjects were instructed to imagine both 
11 In the 90’s, Richard Moran astutely observed that cognitivists often cherry-pick cases of 
“typical” emotion in favor of those that seem to require existence-beliefs (1994).  Since that time, 
many scientific studies (some of which I will turn to here) have both confirmed the connection 
between emotion and counterfactual thinking, and demonstrated just how prevalent this kind of 
affectively-laden thinking is. 
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familiar/realistic and entirely novel/improbable future events. Benoit and 
colleagues hypothesized that this activation of valence and arousal networks 
underlies our ability to predict possible future affective states (i.e. would this make 
me happy or sad?) and guide any future-oriented decisions accordingly. And this is 
just one of several ways in which we affectively engage with imagined scenarios 
on a frequent basis through what is often called “mind-wandering” (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna & Schacter, 2008). When allowing our minds to wander from the 
tasks in front of us, for example, we also frequently engage imaginatively with the 
past, ruminating on e.g. what should have been said or done (but was not), what 
would have occurred had things happened differently, etc. And this kind of thinking 
is not a rare occurrence; as much as 50% of our waking hours are spent thinking 
about what we would have done, could have done, should have done, and might do 
differently in the future (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). 
These forms of mind-wandering all heavily recruit affective processing.  
But notice that in order for these modes of cognition to operate, they cannot rely 
exclusively (if at all) on belief-states as input. When I partake in prospection about 
what it would be like to go on a vacation to Spain, for instance, I surely do not need 
to believe in any reasonable sense that I will go to Spain in order to weigh the 
possibility affectively—the very purpose of affectively-laden prospection is to steer 
an open course! Similarly, when I obsess over what I should have said during last 
week’s lecture, there is no sense in which I believe myself to have both bored my 
students to tears and enthralled them at the same time.  The positive valence and 
arousal evoked by thinking of how well the class could have gone is stored in 
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memory and helps me make well-reasoned future decisions, but no existence-
beliefs are required for that appraisal.  
So, if affectively-driven counterfactual thinking about the world is not 
predicated on beliefs, then what does it take as input? To use Lamarque and 
Carroll’s terminology, it would appear that these acts of imagination simply require 
thought.  But, this needs some elaboration beyond mere ‘mental representations,’ 
or Fregean ‘senses’ or ‘descriptions.’ Although he does not offer much more than 
these terms, Lamarque does gesture in a promising direction when he remarks that 
‘thoughts can differ among themselves with respect to vividness’ (295).  Given that 
thought-content must be open to this variation in vividness, why not posit that 
thoughts are propositions which are sensorily-formatted—e.g. the processing of 
images from a movie screen, engaging with mental pictures formed while reading 
a book, auditory representations of speech, representations of imagined tactile or 
gustatory experience, etc.? The advantage of identifying thoughts with sensory-
motor representations is that, first, such representations may (but do not 
necessarily) become the targets of attitudes such as belief or emotion.  And second, 
sensorily-formatted content will engage the affective system to varying degrees of 
intensity based upon the level of detail expressed in that representation. As Metcalf 
and Mischel (1999) have discussed extensively, the same propositional content e.g. 
the bear is going to eat me can be affectively salient or not depending on the extent 
to which it triggers ‘hotspots’ or ‘cold nodes.’ If, for instance, that propositional 
content is sensorially rich (imagine, for instance, the smell of the bear’s rancid 
breath as it lunges forward, its sharp yellowed teeth snapping at your throat), it will 
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likely engage the affective system more intensely that a sensorially sparse 
representation.12   
 By now, it should be clear that the cognitive mechanisms which 
drive our everyday emotional states can and very often do process input that is not 
accompanied by attitudes of belief or disbelief. This fact, in tandem with the finding 
that reactions to fiction are processed in the same affective brain-areas as 
nonfictional events should be enough to corroborate Thought Theorists’ intuition: 
emotional reaction to fiction are genuine, and real. But, we are still left with another 
pressing question. Are these emotional reactions rational? 
 
IV. THOUGHT THEORY AND RATIONAL EMOTIONS 
As I mentioned at the outset, Radford takes issue with our emotional reactions to 
fiction on the basis that they are “incoherent.”  Arguing against Thought Theory, 
he suggests that if something like a movie monster is the target of Charles’ fear, 
then his fear might be real, but it is irrational; it is irrational because what frightens 
Charles can neither harm nor interact with him in any way (1982b, 261-62). How 
are we to unpack this charge of irrationality?  
If it is the instrumental or practical rationality of Charles’ fear that Radford 
is concerned with, then he must be worried that emotional reactions to fiction work 
against (or fail to further) one or another of Charles’ aims. But, what aim does fear 
of the fictional Green Slime Monster fail to achieve? As many have argued before 
12 To be fair, Carroll in particular elaborates on the notion that thoughts about ‘Dracula’ point to 
the Fregean ‘sense’ of the name or ‘the congeries of properties attributed to the vampire in the 
novel’ (85).  But, I find that the Fregean framework does little to explain how thoughts come to 
evoke affect at the cognitive level. Sensory-formatting should help to fill in that gap. 
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me, it would appear that fiction’s strong elicitation of genuine emotion allows us 
as readers, viewers, listeners, and audience members alike to reach a number of 
practically desirable ends.  To name just as few, partaking in fiction emotionally 
has been shown to increase empathy (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013), such emotions are 
the anchor point of important social institutions around fiction (Carroll, 1990), and 
these emotions are fundamentally pleasurable—they are themselves a practical aim 
(see Joyce, 2000). And now, after looking at the role of the affective system in 
counterfactual thinking and prospection, it becomes even clearer that affectively-
laden imaginative thought plays a crucial role in our fitness as a species. Even when 
they are not themselves plausible or realistic, fictions often provide us with 
potentially useful emotional reference points: although Charles may never need to 
know how he would handle a monster per se, his imaginative encounter with The 
Green Slime Monster leaves him more familiar with his own reactions to danger 
and how to cope with those novel feelings.13  Practice makes perfect, as the saying 
goes. According to Thought Theorists such as Carroll, these emotional reactions—
as long as they are not ‘psychotic, or even neurotic, Fantasies’—do not interfere 
with our lives in a way that is practically irrational.14  
Radford himself concedes this point, admitting—as an admirer of art and 
aesthetics—that in cases such as that of Anna Karenina, ‘it might even be said to 
be irrational’ to discourage emotional engagement with fiction (1982b). But 
13 As Dennett (1995) has commented in other contexts, this remarkable ability to imaginatively 
weigh our options ‘permits our hypotheses to die in our stead.’ 
14 Joyce (2000) builds on this idea by cleverly arguing that we partake in fictions with the aim of 
being emotionally swayed, and so we fulfill our instrumental aims when being moved by works of 
fiction. 
110
Radford doesn’t retract his charge of irrationality; weeping over Anna’s fate must 
be irrational because it overthrows some aim. Which aim?  In the many iterations 
of his complaint, Radford seems to betray a worry about the teleology or purpose 
of emotions themselves. By decrying the fact that we fear and mourn characters that 
do not exist and cannot interact with us, he seems to suggest that the purpose of 
emotion itself is to elicit action or behaviors that are salient in the real environment. 
Charitably, his concern seems to be that our responses to fiction are practically 
irrational because they frustrate their very own ends. 
 While there is strong evidence that emotions evolved in large part to spur 
evolutionarily advantageous behavior (see, e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 2008), it would 
be a mistake to think that the teleology of affect is bound up exclusively with the 
elicitation of action or behavior on its own.  This is precisely why belief—though 
conceptually distinct from affectively evocative thoughts—has such an important 
role to play in our emotional lives.  To better understand the complex ways in which 
affective judgments of valence and judgments of veracity can inform our emotional 
states, we should turn our attention to contemporary models of affective appraisal.  
To date, one of the most prominent and well-accepted theories of affect, 
Appraisal Theory, claims that beliefs are one of many propositional attitudes that 
factor into the generation of our affective states. Drawing on the merits of both 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism, Appraisal Theorists posit that emotions are 
driven by a combination of knee-jerk ‘associative processing’ or ‘innate’ sensory-
motor responses (respectively, Kirby & Smith, 2000; Marsella & Gratch, 2009) in 
tandem with cognitive appraisals of context, beliefs, goals, etc. On this view, when 
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Charles sits in the movie theater as the monster oozes across the screen, he may 
very well feel immediate fear at the sight of the monster’s cavernous, sickly maw 
and the sound of its deathly moan. The mere thought or sensorily-formatted 
representation of the creature’s disgusting, ‘hot’ properties, though unaccompanied 
by belief, can be appraised for seeming goodness and seeming badness.  Charles’ 
appraisal in this case is, namely, that slime monsters are bad. Importantly, however, 
the affective appraisal monsters = bad is just one of many kinds of input being 
appraised by Charles: he also believes that he is safe in the movie theater, he judges 
that those are impressive special effects, his goal is to see how the director resolves 
this tension. While valenced appraisals of the Green Slime Monster can non-
doxastically elicit fear, that negatively-valenced appraisal can then be assessed and 
mitigated in the wider context of Charles’ aforementioned beliefs, thoughts, values 
and goals.15  
 If the cognitive mechanisms associated with affect have a practical purpose 
to be hampered, it is not to assess the veracity or probability of thought-content or 
how to go about interacting with our environments—that requires much more 
complicated input. The purpose of affect is simply (though not insignificantly) to 
assess value and draw attention to the targets of our emotional output. When we 
respond emotionally to fictions, we succeed to that end. 
15 This may go some way towards resolving another well-known paradox in aesthetics that is built 
around how we are able to derive pleasure from unpleasant states, or the ‘paradox of tragedy.’ The 
fact that the affective appraisal system responds simultaneously to multiple e.g. belief and thought 
contents makes sense of the recently confirmed finding that reading gut-wrenching fictions evokes 
both positive and negative valence (Altmann, Bohrn, Lubrich, Menninghaus, & Jacobs, 2012).  In 
such cases, Appraisal Theory allows that we are able to respond to the thought of Anna Karenina’s 
fate with genuine grief, while also appraising Tolstoy’s masterful evocation of sadness as good-
seeming. 
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But what about the theoretical rationality of our affective tendencies? In 
general terms, to be theoretically irrational is to be ill-founded or under-supported 
by the proper evidence. Usually, this standard is used to evaluate doxastic states—
when both evidence and argumentation support the truth of a propositional belief, 
that belief is theoretically rational. It is not uncommon for there to be tension 
between our theoretically rational and instrumentally rational beliefs. I could have 
a great deal of evidence to support the belief that I am not my mother’s favorite 
child, for example, but it may not be in my best interest psychologically to believe 
it. Over the span of many years and across multiple articles, Radford seems to 
suggest that emotions may exhibit this same tension: though their practical benefits 
are many, he holds that there is something plainly wrong about building emotions 
on representations of fiction—it is like building belief on contrary evidence.   
In response to this criticism, Carroll states that perhaps ‘it is just a fact about 
humans that they can be frightened of the idea [of fictional entities]…It is just the 
way we are built’ (83). He goes on to argue that our emotional reactions to the 
Green Slime Monster are not ‘silly,’ because they are normatively appropriate; they 
are rational in the sense that they are prescribed. Despite the intuitive upshot of 
Carroll’s defense, Thought Theory does not completely forestall Radford’s claim 
that e.g. cringing for Desdemona is ‘irrational and incoherent.’ Just because 
emotional reactions to fiction are normatively accepted or common does not mean 
they are theoretically rational. Further, even if humans are endowed with the 
capacity to be frightened by thoughts, how does the universality of that capacity 
thwart the accusation of irrationality? If we do not need to believe fictions to emote 
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rationally, then what exactly is our cringing, weeping, and trembling about and how 
is it theoretically rational? 
The problem with Radford’s grievance, I argue, is that the standards of 
theoretical rationality which hold intuitively for beliefs plainly do not translate to 
cases of affective appraisal. As we have already seen, representations of valence 
are not in themselves representations of truth : they are measures of value, or 
seeming-goodness and seeming-badness (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). As a result, one 
might think that an emotional response is rationally grounded (that is to say, 
theoretically rational in the sense appropriate for emotions) to the extent that the 
evaluation contained in the response is an appropriate match for the representation 
whose appraisal provides the input for that response. On this view, fear at a 
ferociously-represented bear may then be rational or irrational based upon whether 
that representation includes elements that are good-seeming or bad-seeming, 
regardless of whether the bear is really there being perceived, or merely imagined. 
As it stands, there are numerous theories detailing what might make one’s 
emotional responses theoretically rational. For our purposes here, it is worth noting 
that some of these theories focus precisely on the notion of appropriateness or 
fitness just mentioned. Ruse and Wilson (1968), for instance, argue that the 
theoretical rationality of any given emotion is rooted in the biological functions of 
those emotions; happiness should target events that are potentially beneficial to the 
organism, sadness should target those objects and events that might involve 
potential loss, etc. In the case of our bear at dusk, fear is rational because it is 
directed towards a creature and situation that can at least in principle be dangerous. 
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While I am hesitant to apply this standard to emotions simpliciter—in part because 
I wish to remain impartial on the question of whether emotions are natural kinds—
the underlying principle of these ‘fitness’ views speaks to what makes the appraisal 
component of emotion seem well founded or ill founded. While a person need not 
believe the cause of her e.g. fear to be real in order for that fear to be rational, she 
does need to have some evidence that the target of her fear could hypothetically be 
bad in some way. 
Evidence for the fittingness of our appraisals can be both innately channeled 
and learned. Presumably, many affective valuations initially evolved and were 
passed on to confer some evolutionary advantage e.g. bodily damage will often 
generate negative valence/high arousal to result in pain, while sugary foods that 
provide life-sustaining energy will likely generate positive valence/high arousal, 
and result in pleasure (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013). At the same time, individual 
experience and learned association should also factor strongly into whether an 
appraisal is appropriate or theoretically rational. For instance, the seeming-badness 
of our bear encounter seems rational or appropriate enough for the average hiker, 
but a life-long bear trainer and wildlife enthusiast would presumably be elated by 
the encounter. If both of these reactions seem rational, it is because their appraisals 
of the potential dangerousness of the very same perceptual representations are 
appropriate to each case. Given her past (in)experience with bears and an innate 
predisposition towards avoiding particularly large predatory animals, the hiker has 
good reason to appraise the bear as dangerous; the trainer, by contrast, has good 
evidence that bears can be harmless when handled properly, and so her enthusiasm 
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seems equally appropriate. Were these appraisals to occur in response to merely 
imagined or fictional contents, the fittingness criteria would hold just as well. 
Admittedly, while I find this ‘appropriateness’ model to be persuasive, it is 
one of many views on the theoretical rationality of emotion.16  My aim here is not, 
however, to hold up such ‘fittingness’ views as the only plausible answer to 
questions about the theoretical rationality of emotions.  Rather, I want to highlight 
the fact that our criteria for assessing the theoretical rationality of belief need not—
in fact, should not—apply in the case of valenced appraisals or emotion in general.  
To assume that emotion must be grounded in evidence of veridicality is simply to 
beg the question in favor of cognitivist’s intuitions. Given that the affective system 
is routinely recruited for thinking about fictional or imagined events, we have every 
reason to maintain that appraisals can be theoretically rational or irrational based 
upon grounding in e.g. perceived value, not evidence of existence. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As should now be apparent, Lamarque and Carroll’s work on Thought Theory went 
a long way towards defending the status of our emotional reactions to fiction as 
both real and rational. But, while the theory championed our intuitive assumptions 
about emotion and fiction, these theorists did little to motivate their founding 
premise that emotional reactions to fictions count as genuine emotions. By looking 
at the cognitive science of emotion and the role that affect plays in counterfactual 
mind-wandering and prospection, I hope to have demonstrated that emotional states 
16 For a more detailed look at this issue, see Deonna & Teroni (2012) 
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need not be predicated on anything like belief-states about the world.  Further, by 
examining the function of affect, I hope to have shown that emotion is not 
susceptible to the same charges of theoretical irrationality as, say, belief. As I have 
indicated, researchers in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences still have 
many fascinating questions to address with respect to emotion, affect, and appraisal.  
In light of what we now know, however, the paradox of fiction is starting to look 
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